THE OLYMPICS: CAN RUSSIA LOSE? YURI BROKHIN

THE NATION

JULY 17-24, 1976 50 cents

Robert M. Entman & Bonnie Koenig
PACK JOURNALISM
THE 'CONSERVATIVE' MYTH

Fred Kaplan
CONDOR:
THE MISSILE NOBODY WANTS

Report from Luanda
A NEW ANGOLAN SOCIETY **KEVIN BROWN**

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LETTERS

Luddites at the bedside

New Haven, Conn.

I was troubled by Peter Dreyer's review of the Ivan Illich book [*Medical Nemesis: The Expropriation of Health, The Nation*, June 12] not so much by what was said, as by what wasn't. I suppose I suffer a bit from the usual reasons of wounded professional pride, but inasmuch as I am guilty of many of the same criticisms of professional conduct, that isn't the sum of my objections. It's mostly that the implications of swallowing the new dogma whole, "the destructive dominance of industry in our society," raises questions.

The Illich dogma requires surrender to a neo-Luddite philosophy that demands destruction of the machinery of medical care. True, Illich does allow people to use the medical mafia if they see fit, but it is their freedom he is guaranteeing, not the integrity of the system. However, unless you destroy the machines, there remains a bureaucracy that has to be managed. If we want the technology that will remain to be disbursed equitably, there will still have to be a system within which it will work. As Dreyer points out, ". . . the social cost of making possible such treatment for a *privileged minority* is, quite literally, sickeningly prohibitive." [Emphasis added.]

True, medical care does not contribute much to the *health* of the population and may indeed play a part in making the population *unhealthy* ("iatrogenesis"). Nevertheless, after we have done all that might and ought to be done for the sake of health: better nutrition and housing; cleaning up the environment and the work place; elimination of poisons from air, water and food; immunizing against preventable disease; preventing whatever can be prevented, people will still get sick, suffer pain, require surgery, demand continuing extensive care and supervision for their chronic diseases and so on.

What shall we do then? . . . We're not about to give up our technology and retreat to some simple Arcadian existence. And I doubt that we should! I believe in tools being the servants of man and we can bring the medical tools under control if we want to.

So, while recognizing the validity of the criticisms, can't we opt for a smaller, more efficient, more equitable, less costly medical-care system? Isn't that more logical than to go on from Illich's feisty religious polemics to embrace some questionable theories of etiology of disease; as if by wishing away disease the medical problems will vanish?

But there is another aspect to this that is even more distressing and that relates to the portion of the world and the segment of our own society that is without access to even minimal medical care for all kinds of very real horrendous diseases. Millions of Americans do not have access to minimal effective medical care because of discrimination, poverty, geographic isolation. They are sicker than the average, too, because of the same factors. Libertarians like Illich would "permit" them to "request" care if they are so inclined and where, pray, will they get it?

How much of the eager turning to advisers like Illich is a product of conscious or subconscious elitism and/or racism that is subtly continuing and maintaining the discriminatory practices that make and keep these people sick? Certainly the enthusiasm of the reactionary social and political groups for "prevention" and "self-care" has considerable roots in that social philosophy.

Self-discipline, and the anchorite mode, may suit Father Illich and an occasional politician or governor; I doubt if it is a life style for all of us. Let us beware of using the issue as another device for maintenance of the disenfranchisement of a portion of the population of the world, of the poor and minorities in our own country. I don't believe in letting the helpless shift for themselves, letting people "rediscover responsibility" (meaning benign neglect?).

George A. Silver, M.D.
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EDITORIALS

Topless Summit

"This summit is being held," declared President Ford at the meeting of the seven major non-Communist industrial nations in Puerto Rico in late June, "to shape the future rather than reacting to it." Not even the most sophisticated language analyzer could make sense out of those Presidential words, and there was little more sense to the whole shindig at Dorado Beach.

What the "summit" proved was that a U.S. President, though in deep political trouble at home, still had enough muscle to beckon the heads of the other industrial powers to his green baize conference table and treat them to a lecture on economic moderation of a striking irrelevancy. The message, as Charles Lipson of Harvard wrote in the *Boston Globe* (July 2), was "Let's get together and all go slow."

One problem of this hastily called and ill-prepared meeting was that the industrial powers face quite different problems as they move to recover from the recent (or current) recession without setting off a new round of inflation. Japan, for example, is causing its trading partners some anxiety by exporting more than it imports. Britain and Italy, both of which are already battling serious inflation, face the opposite problem. Still, they all had to listen to the same go-slow homily from the President of the United States, whose place in the pulpit was guaranteed by the fact that this country is still the world's chief banker and arms salesman. As the headline in *The New York Times* said on the day after the "summit" began to be "held," "Few Results Expected—Little Enthusiasm Reported Among Delegations from the Other Participants."

The world does indeed face serious problems of economic policy, and they are not restricted to those of the industrially developed nations. The "interdependence of the industrial democracies," of which Ford said he became convinced at the meeting in Puerto Rico, is a fact well known for years, if not decades. Beyond that, and increasingly important, lies what is delicately called the "north-south" problem—in essence, how much the industrial powers should pay the "developing" nations for their raw materials. It seems certain that the oil producers will soon jack up their prices. The other producers of commodities, none of them as powerfully situated to get their way as the petroleum potentates, are nevertheless making increasingly strong demands for protection against wild fluctuations in the prices they get in the markets dominated by the industrial nations. At Dorado Beach the north-south question was given a once-over and then kicked under the rug.

When Winston Churchill coined the phrase "conversations at the summit," there was substance to the idea. Some meaning stuck with the term even after a series of sessions among leaders of governments which eventually included East and West. Summitry somehow survived the qualifier "mini-." But a new word may now have to be minted. If Gerald Ford can say that a summit is being

Cover. Luanda: FNLA International Women's Day Parade. Photo by Wendy Holmes.

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"held" (how, by the way—in both hands?), then the notion of a meeting of statesmen has been vulgarized out of existence. Next it will be a verb (to summit) or an adjective (a satisfactory summit experience) or even an adverb (summitly).

George Orwell wrote in "Politics and the English Language" (in 1946, at about the time Churchill coined his summit phrase) that "to think clearly is a necessary first step towards political rejuvenation; so that the fight against bad English is not frivolous. . . ." It is unlikely that President Ford has read that essay on politics, language and straight thinking. If he had, he might have said that the meeting in Puerto Rico was held in the foothills, with never a glimpse of the summit. In actual fact, he held it at sea level, and for transparent and discreditable political reasons of his own.

Brezhnev at Bay

If President Ford's mini-meeting by the Caribbean shores was a nothing, the Communists' session in East Berlin was a distinct minus—at least for the Russians. This session was to have been the capstone to the Brezhnev era, and he had been seeking to convene it for three years. Instead, it provided the epitaph on the gravestone of the "indestructible monolithic unity" of international communism.

George Orwell would have savored this one, too, for its jargon-ridden obscurantism. But beyond language like "spur us on to unceasing renewal in our political elaboration" (Berlinguer of the Italian Communist Party said that) there was a refreshing openness and clarity to some of the thinking expressed by Communist leaders from Western Europe. It was made clear to Brezhnev & Co. that the days of "proletarian internationalism" were dead and gone. Speaker after speaker punched holes in the fabric of that old Communist device, which once waved above the Kremlin, signaling Soviet hegemony.

The message of virtually all of the Communist parties of the West was that the idea of communism was not dead for them but that each of them would pursue that elusive ideal in its own way, as determined by the circumstances in each country. "The Communist parties do not consider all those who are not in agreement with their policies or who hold a critical attitude toward their activity as being anti-Communist," reads one sentence of the conference document (a curious instrument—said to be largely the work of Tito, that old heretic—which was issued without signatures or fanfare). As for the old centralism, it was cast overboard in language recognizing "the principles of equality and sovereign independence of each party, noninterference in internal affairs and respect for their free choice of different roads in the struggle for social change of a progressive nature and for socialism."

The most vivid language at the East Berlin meeting

Notice to Our Readers

The Nation is publishing on its summer schedule. The next issue will be dated July 31-August 7.

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The Nation is published weekly (except for first week in January, and bi-weekly in July and August) by the Nation Company and copyright 1976 in the U.S.A. by the Nation Associates, Inc., 333 Sixth Avenue, New York, N. Y. 10014. Tel: CH 2-8400. Second class postage paid at New York, N. Y.

Subscription Price: One year $17.50; two years, $30. Add $1 per year postage for Canada and Mexico; $2 other foreign.

Change of Address: It is essential that subscribers ordering a change of address give four weeks' notice and provide their old as well as their new address. Please give Zip Code numbers for both addresses.

Manuscripts. All work submitted will be read by the editors. The magazine cannot, however, be responsible for the return of unsolicited manuscripts unless they are accompanied by stamped, self-addressed envelopes.

Information to Libraries: The Nation is indexed in Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature, Book Review Digest, Book Review Index and the Public Affairs Information Service.

THE NATION

Volume 223
No. 2

JUL 12 1976
The Sherrod Library
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and afterward came from the Spanish party's leader, Santiago Carillo, who kept playing on the analogy between the Communist Party and the Catholic Church in the days of the Inquisition, when heresy flourished and was harshly put down. "Heretics usually turn out to be all right," Carillo told Flora Lewis of *The New York Times* (July 7). "They are ahead of their time, but after all they are right. We want Communists to be heretics. When we become conservatives, we are no longer right." At the East Berlin session Carillo remarked that "we have lost the characteristic of a church," and later he defended his use of the "comparison with Luther."

All this playful, and serious, heretical talk must have been difficult for Brezhnev to sit through. But, having summoned the meeting to crown his era, he had no choice but to listen. It must have been doubly hard for him as he reflected on what was happening in his own back yard, in the restless satellite Poland. There the workers had risen once again in strong and effective protest against a large hike in food prices imposed by the Gierek government in an attempt to bring the Polish economy back into some kind of equilibrium. They even ripped up the rails over which Brezhnev was to have rolled toward the Communist "summit" in East Berlin, forcing the Russian party chief to fly above all that turmoil to his rendezvous with the other party leaders.

This Polish uprising of workers, the third since Communist rule was clamped on them after the war, is an extraordinary event. It forced the Gierek government to withdraw the price increases and to enter into a kind of dialogue with the workers. They are unorganized, of course, but they function in the Polish system as if they were members of highly structured unions in an advanced capitalist nation, pressing their demands insistently on the tight state apparatus which is supposed to control them and subordinate their demands to those of the collectivity. Poland is the only Eastern European satellite nation where this happens, and it is an omen that Moscow cannot disregard.

Brezhnev has much more to worry about than the vanished fealty of the Communists of the West. He and his successors must start concerning themselves in the most serious way with the cracks that threaten what remains of the Communist monolith, and on their very doorstep.

Garden Party

The Democratic National Convention in Madison Square Garden will build about as much suspense as did the Joe Louis vs. Paulino Uzcudun bout in 1935 in the Garden, which ended with the Basque woodchopper's graceful fall to the canvas in the first round. It will be as harmonious as a Baptist prayer meeting in Plains, Ga., and as ceremonial as the recent Bicentennial Glorious Fourth. It will have pageantry to spare and all that it will apparently lack is political substance.

Having lost the last two Presidential contests because of self-inflicted wounds sustained in Vietnam, the Democrats are determined to make their nominating convention a love feast. They mean to show the American people that they are united, purposeful and competent to govern. They will smugly look down their recently battered noses at the undignified scrap still going on in the rival Republican camp and confidently look forward to victory at the polls in November.

Their optimism, we think, is justified. Governor Carter has won the nomination through thirty primaries, by means fair and square (very square). His nomination will be historic, in the sense that the South he represents will be reconnected to the mainstream of American political life and he will be the first candidate of truly Southern origin to reach the White House in more than a century. There could be no better advertisement for the unity the Democrats will proclaim after years of bitter division. Electorally, the case will be extraordinarily appealing and the victory should be immense.

Victory for what? The smoothly jointed platform the Democrats will adopt tells us little. It is notable, like so many of its predecessors, for the vagueness of its language and for its failure to face the real issues that beset the country. Its tone is evasive rather than forthright.

The platform seems to be based on the same assumption of a "conservative" mood in the United States that lay behind most of the oratory from the stump during the primary season. The whole "anti-government" and "anti-Washington" school of rhetoric has been an attempt to reflect that widely believed sentiment (accepted unquestioningly by much of the national press). This putative mood was based on a reading, or misreading, of the national opinion polls. In an article in this issue, Robert Entman and Bonnie Koenig draw an altogether different conclusion from the poll data. They read them as saying, in effect, that a substantial majority of the American people favor *more* (but more effective) government action to solve the problems they face.

Common sense, a quality always in short supply, supports this view. Surely it is sensible to conclude that the majority of the people want their government to protect them, and their interests, as against "the interests," which used to be the euphemism for corporate America. The current problem is that many people have found reason to believe that the government is more concerned with "the interests" than with the general welfare.

For the Democrats there is an obvious, if not easy, solution to this problem. It is to restore government to its proper role as defender and protector of the masses of the people. The Democrats' record in this regard is not impeccable, but it is far superior to the Republicans'. The Republicans have always been the party of the special interests and never more so than under Nixon and Ford. They will have to defend that record in the national election this November, and it will not be an easy job.

We disagree with the Entman-Koenig argument on one point. It is too pessimistic in assessing the chance that, should the Democrats fail to base their campaign on the idea of an "activist" government, a large stay-at-home vote would give the election to the Republicans. Even if candidate Carter makes the mistake of conducting that kind of campaign, he would still win handsomely because this year it is a "time for change," if ever there was one.

Carter has made few mistakes since he set out for the White House, and there is no reason to think that he

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With regret we announce the departure of Mary Simon, our Advertising Manager, from the staff of *The Nation*. For twenty-six years she has worked energetically and well on behalf of this publication, and her presence will be missed by every member of the staff.

will badly misjudge the national feeling in the months ahead. His behavior at the party unity celebration in Madison Square Garden, otherwise known as the Democratic National Convention, will tell us a great deal about how large his victory in November will be, and even give us a hint of what kind of President James Earl Carter Jr. will make.

Israel's Skill and Daring

The people of Israel are understandably, and properly, elated by the brilliant success of the operation to free the hostages from Uganda. The rest of the world joins in the chorus of praise for the success of this feat of nerve and arms. Even the Third World countries that have been loudest in their condemnation of Israel for its handling of the Palestinian problem have had to admire, in private at least, the skill and courage that informed that bold rescue. (Compare it to the clumsy and vainglorious American operation to "free" the *Mayagüez* off Cambodia last year, which resulted in more than forty unnecessary deaths.)

The fact is that Israel was doing the work of the rest of the so-called civilized world when it staged that coup against the hostage-holding hijackers. It was proclaiming to all those bands of muddled and hysterical desperadoes that they can be made to pay with their lives for this kind of outrageous behavior. Israel was saying that it will "bear any burden, take any risk" to deliver its own people from the hands of murderous extremists in any cause. But can we be confident that this operation will have a deterrent effect on the clan of international terrorists? Probably not. They are a special breed of fanatics, immune to reason and contemptuous of human life.

There is, however, one way in which the world can move to stop this business of using innocent hostages for "higher" political purposes. Nations, and international organizations, can at last develop a system of sanctions against countries that tolerate, and even play host to, these gangsters of the air. In the recent case, the savage dictator of Uganda, Idi Amin Dada, clearly was an accomplice of the hijackers. He even, according to Israel's Defense Minister Peres, sent a plane to Somalia to pick up more terrorists to help guard the hostages. And, of course, at any time his soldiers could have overpowered the terrorists and freed the hostages at Entebbe with a minimal risk of bloodshed.

Amin has had the nerve to demand a meeting of the U.N. Security Council (other African nations have weakly gone along with him) to deal with the "wanton act of aggression" by Israel in freeing its citizens. That meeting should be held, but it should be turned into a forum for finally confronting the problem posed by international terrorism and for working out a system of punishing countries that fail to take the most severe measures against it. If the hijackers could find no safe haven for their dirty work, that would indeed be a deterrent.

The Brass Band

Two incidents involving high military officers and the Congress of the United States in the past few days shed light on the current state of civilian control of the military, that prime article of faith in the American system of government. One concerns the irrepressible old maverick admiral, Hyman G. Rickover (now slightly repressed), and the other the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. George S. Brown of the Air Force, who keeps embarrassing his powerful friends and protectors on the Senate military committees with his clumsy anti-Semitic statements.

General Brown, it will be recalled, is the hay-foot, straw-foot political thinker who two years ago at Duke University, in a colloquy with students, uttered a lot of claptrap about how American Jews owned too many banks and newspapers and thus exerted "undue influence" on this country's policies. After a handy tape recording of Brown's deep thinking blew away the protective foam the Pentagon had tried to spread over that gaffe, Brown was called onto the Commander in Chief's carpet, reprimanded, and told not to do it again. Incredibly, he did. Even more incredibly, the occasion was upon his renomination as chairman of the Joint Chiefs by President Ford.

The Senate Armed Services Committee, which has a long record of fawning on the brass, simply had to raise the embarrassing question with the General before they rubber-stamped his new term as the country's top soldier. Did he still think, a Senator found the courage to ask, that the American Jewish community had that "undue influence"? His answer was that "in all candor" he did think so—and that the "undue influence" was on Congress itself!

Gently questioned by his powerful Senatorial fans, Brown then proceeded to try to qualify his remark (he had got the signal by then). He said that he had made two "wrong" statements at Duke and one that was "inappropriate." The wrong ones, he declared, were the ones about Jewish control of banks and newspapers. The "inappropriate" one, whatever that could mean, was that "I felt that the Jewish community in the U.S. had an undue influence on the Congress of the U.S." Brown then tried to wriggle off the hook by saying that the influence he had in mind was "not unusual. There are other special-interest groups that have influence or seek to achieve influence on the Congress of the U.S."

At that point the Senate committee should have adjourned the hearing on the fitness of General Brown and unanimously voted against his confirmation. Instead, only two out of fourteen members of the committee voted against him (Taft, Republican of Ohio, and McIntyre, Democrat of New Hampshire). The rest pretended they had not heard Brown's nasty, ignorant and insulting non-

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sense and voted to confirm, as did the Senate as a whole.

It was a craven performance by the Senate. The country does not need or want deep political thinkers at the head of its armed forces, but it has a right to expect common decency and common sense on the part of the brass. And if Congress is ever to pick its reputation up off the floor, it must learn to act "appropriately" in cases like that of the naively anti-Semitic chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The case of the crusty, curmudgeonly 76-year-old Admiral Rickover, still on active duty because of his cozy relations with the barons of the Congressional defense establishment, is another thing. Rickover's specialty is to sell, and oversell, nuclear ships to Congress and then loudly complain that the people who build them are charging too much—as if that were news. In the present instance, he has been causing painful headaches to his theoretical superiors in the Pentagon by vigorously lobbying against a Defense Department proposal to rewrite its contracts with the Newport News Shipbuilding and Drydock Company, which builds much of the nuclear Navy of which Rickover is the proud "father." With characteristic understatement, Rickover has called this cost-escalation plan "one of the biggest ripoffs in the history of the United States." He may well be right about that, given the Pentagon's grotesque history of treating defense contractors as if they were struggling entrepreneurs in the age of Adam Smith instead of bloated parasitical dependents of the Defense establishment.

Nevertheless, Deputy Secretary of Defense Clements, the Texas oil millionaire who handles these little matters of billions, felt he had to bow to the threats from at least two of the big contractors that they would stop building Navy ships unless they got their extra dollars. So he called in Rickover, sat him down on a sofa with his (again theoretical) superior, Admiral Holloway, Chief of Naval Operations, and, according to John W. Finney in *The New York Times* (July 3), managed to flatter or bully this Congressional Admiral into submission by suggesting that his niche in history as "the father of the nuclear fleet" might be obliterated if he became known as "the man who blocked the expansion of the Navy." For the moment the treatment seems to have worked, and Rickover has shut up.

Without going into the accounting details of this thoroughly routine tale of cost overruns in the defense business, the point can be made that Rickover and his Congressional allies are one side of an unhealthy procurement equation, the other side of which consists of Clements and Co. and the Pentagon's lavishly kept contractors. As for any hope of reforming this wasteful system, we should remind ourselves that Congress as a whole this year rushed through record defense appropriations as if we were fully engaged in a shooting war.

ABORTIONS DENIED

LAWRENCE LADER

The growing denial of abortion rights, supposedly guaranteed by the 1973 U.S. Supreme Court decision, has not come from highly publicized Constitutional amendments but from a new and almost unnoticed danger: the refusal of abortion services.

In this respect, public hospitals are the most serious offenders against the Supreme Court, although hospitals supported by public money are required, above all others, to follow the law. A recent Planned Parenthood study by the Alan Guttmacher Institute (covering 1973 and generally the first quarter of 1974) shows that only 15 per cent of public, short-term general hospitals performed even one abortion in that period. In nonmetropolitan areas, the rebellion against the Court was even worse—only 8 per cent of public hospitals performing abortions. In fact, only three states—North Carolina, New York and Oregon, along with the District of Columbia, supplied abortion services in more than half of their public hospitals.

The damage to women is accentuated by the geographic imbalance of this boycott. In vast areas of the country, particularly the South and Southwest, women can get no public services. Twelve states, including Connecticut and Delaware on the Atlantic seaboard, performed no public hospital abortions in the period covered by the survey. But even in the heavily industrialized and populated states of the Midwest and Northeast, services are often minimal. New Jersey public hospitals did sixty abortions in a year and a quarter, Missouri ten, Indiana less than 400.

Poor women suffer most. The number of abortions for the poor in the public hospitals of thirty-seven states filled only 15 per cent of the estimated need. Low-income women in areas where abortions are denied not only have the cost of travel for 300 or 500 miles to a public facility; they may have to hire a baby-sitter for two days to take care of children at home. Women with jobs may even forfeit a few days' pay. Similar obstacles and, in addition, the frequent desire to keep their abortions secret from parents and schools, penalize the young. As a result, only a little more than half the 420,000 women under 20 who want abortions manage to get them.

The refusal of public hospitals to obey the law has created a highly discriminatory system of health care. Most early abortions today are supplied to women of means by private clinics that charge $150 to $250. Furthermore, a result of this discriminatory system has been to create "islands" of abortion services in widely spaced centers inaccessible to many of the poor. California and New York provide about half of all abortions; the twelve metropolitan areas (including Los Angeles and New York City) about 60 per cent. The Planned Parenthood study, based on 1974 projections, shows the consequence of this discrimination: 29 to 50 per cent of women who want abortions couldn't obtain them.

Lawrence Lader is the author of Abortion *and* Abortion II: Making the Revolution, *and chairman of the board, National Abortion Rights Action League, 1969-76.*

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This latest revolt by public hospitals against the Supreme Court decision has added to the destruction of an already crippled system. Three state-owned hospitals in the Scranton, Pa. area announced in October that they would refuse to obey the state Attorney General's directive to perform abortions (and voluntary sterilizations as well). This is a harsh, illegal blow at women, for no private hospital in the area performs abortions. It is also an unfortunate example of religious interference in public policy—local Catholic officials warned Catholic doctors and personnel that they would be excommunicated if they cooperated in any abortion program.

The Scranton confrontation portends a dangerous new strategy by the Catholic hierarchy. Its major attack on legal abortion has hitherto come by way of Constitutional amendments designed to overthrow the Supreme Court decision, but that approach requires an exhausting struggle for Congressional legislation; it has already failed in Senate subcommittee. Why should the Catholic hierarchy concentrate on amendments alone when the Court decision can be blocked by pressure on public hospitals and even private facilities? In November, the Roman Catholic bishops of the United States announced the establishment of "identifiable, tightly knit, and well-organized" anti-abortion organizations in each Congressional district, and these organizations will undoubtedly step up the attack on public abortion services.

Americans who want to protect abortion rights have been slow to meet this threat. Community mobilizations against public hospitals that refuse to obey the law should certainly be the first step. The threat must also be widely publicized, as happened in Maryland a few years ago when the legislature was considering a bill to conform state law with the Supreme Court decision. Catholic officials had warned Catholic lawmakers of excommunication if they supported the bill, but immediate press exposure of this threat created enough hullabaloo to force the hierarchy to back down.

By far the most effective way to insure that public hospitals obey the law would be to institute an omnibus court suit in key states seeking to apply the penalty that hurts most: money. If hospitals supported by public funds refuse to follow public law, court action must quickly cut them off from all federal and local aid. That may seem a drastic solution, but abortion rights are too precious to let them be blocked by an illegal revolt against the Supreme Court.

PACK JOURNALISM

THE 'CONSERVATIVE' MYTH

ROBERT M. ENTMAN & BONNIE KOENIG

The "boys on the bus" are up to their usual headline-hunting tricks this campaign year. Reporters covering the Presidential race are oversimplifying and distorting their data to catch the attention of an easily distracted public, and there is nothing new about that. But for liberals and progressives there is a particularly ominous note in this year's news obsession. The media have invented a "conservative mood" among the electorate and are stressing it every chance they get, reading each poll and all the primary results as further evidence of a massive outcry against progressive, "big-government" programs.

The journalists are confusing and combining two distinct phenomena and coming up with labels ("conservatism" or "anti-big government mood") that correctly apply to neither. It *is* true that the citizenry is disturbed by rapid growth in taxes (i.e., government spending), and that people are suspicious of politicians and government. But from a careful look at just what people have disclosed by their primary voting (and nonvoting) and survey responses, we find *no concrete evidence at all* that these sentiments reflect a simplistic demand to roll back active government. Press misrepresentation of the public mood must be exposed before it negates the process by which elections are supposed to translate public opinion into public policy—before media-inspired "neo-conservatism" defeats progressive programs and candidates the way their earlier coverage helped defeat George McGovern.

Robert Entman teaches political science at Dickinson College in Carlisle, Pa. Bonnie Koenig, Mr. Entman's research assistant, waded through much misleading media coverage to find reliable data on public opinion.

From television and news magazines, one gets the picture of a rightward "sea change" in public attitudes toward government. Thus, at the close of one network's coverage of the Massachusetts primary, according to *The New Republic* (March 13), an overzealous commentator proclaimed that "the electorate is more conservative today than at any time since pre-New Deal days." Two months later, this myth had become a tiresome cliché, with CBS News's *Sixty Minutes* devoting one of its three segments on May 2 to the following theme, announced by Mike Wallace: [Big government] "has turned out to be one of the biggest issues in this campaign. . . . Americans are fed up with bureaucrats and elected officials who rush pell mell into social programs." *Newsweek* has regularly referred to the growing "swing toward neo-conservatism."

Such mutually reinforcing musings by those caught up in what Timothy Crouse (in *The Boys on the Bus*) calls "pack journalism" should not be trusted. For all their faults, public opinion surveys are more reliable indicators of the state of citizen attitudes. And what do those polls tell us? For more than a generation now, whenever asked in surveys to state its policy priorities, the public's answer

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has been the same: economic security—protection for jobs and against inflation; provisions for housing, medical care, old-age benefits and education.

Today, in the face of the supposedly raging tide of conservative backlash, surveys conducted by *The New York Times* and CBS, by Louis Harris and George Gallup, show that economic security and related issues are still the major concerns of the public. Harris found in December 1975 that for "an 85% majority . . . the economy is not only their main worry, but it is the one problem they would like to see the person that is elected President in 1976 do something about." Poll after poll since then has shown that the areas which most trouble the public are precisely those that will require vigorous government action in domestic affairs. Gallup found in January 1976 that 47% of those polled named "the high cost of living" as "the most important problem facing this country today"; the second most common response was "unemployment," mentioned by 23%. Far down the list, *cited by 3%*, was "excessive spending on social problems."

And the last time Gallup asked a national sample for its views on federal spending priorities (June 1975), the following areas were mentioned most often: health (53%), public education (48%), law enforcement (41%), welfare aid to the poor (32%) and public housing (26%). Least often mentioned were defense (16%), agricultural aid (15%), highway improvement (13%) and foreign aid (3%). Given that most agricultural aid goes to agribusiness and most foreign aid to right-wing dictatorships, these priorities, on balance, look pretty liberal to us.

A survey of public opinion conducted by Harris in December 1975, *does* suggest a rightward swing in public opinion. Harris found 43% of the public preferred that "the country move in a more conservative direction. . . ." But qualifications that should be added to these findings—qualifications which journalists usually omit—mean, in Harris's own words, that "it is not correct to conclude that the country is turning massively toward conservatism." For one thing, 57% of the respondents did *not* endorse a conservative shift. Harris also found that "taken on a seven-year basis, the trend has been away from people classifying themselves as conservatives, down 10 points [from 37% to 27%] over that period."

In addition, the word "conservative" embraces an amalgam of attitudes. Given the volatility of such "social issues" as drugs, busing, student demonstrations, sexual permissiveness—areas where the populace is clearly and emotionally "conservative" and where the authorities have recently been rather "liberal"—an acknowledgment of a "conservative" orientation may not imply a rejection of "big government." Indeed, it may imply a call for yet a *bigger* government to regulate behavior!

Harris did find that the major component of the desire for a conservative move was a reaction against taxes and government spending. Yet note how meticulously Harris described this sentiment: "People are disenchanted with liberalism because they feel it involves excessive federal spending *that has not solved problems confronting the country*" (emphasis added). Few people would argue that the problems confronting the country have been solved. What most commentators fail to take into account is that people are disenchanted because the problems persist, not because they think they should be ignored. People still have the same problems, and they still want government to solve them.

The most dramatic evidence we've been able to find in support of this reading of public opinion came from a poll cited by Howard K. Smith on the June 4th *ABC Evening News*. It is, to be sure, a survey of residents of just one Congressional district, so the results should be interpreted with caution. A plurality of respondents did favor a reduction of government spending. But then, when asked their attitudes on specific areas of the budget, 71% said they wanted to continue or even increase current levels of spending on pollution control; 84% felt similarly about health expenditures, as did 87% about education. These respondents want no cuts in programs that benefit most citizens.

Our belief in the significance of this poll is bolstered by the fact that the Congressional district where it was taken —Ohio's 17th—is represented in Washington by the ultraconservative Republican, John Ashbrook. Polls taken in the vast majority of districts that have more liberal Representatives would be unlikely to show stronger conservative sentiments. In fact, a national survey taken by *The Washington Post* in May found a similar desire for a smaller federal government combined with several liberal attitudes on matters of specific public policy.

There is a way to make sense of this apparent contradiction: implicitly, people may be calling for substantial changes in the distribution of income and wealth. Many appear to want a radical shift of the *costs* of "big government" toward those who can afford to pay, and a redirection of government *benefits* to the working- and middle-class majority that need them. There is some direct evidence for this assertion: The *Post* survey just cited found a 57% majority in favor of the proposition that "The government should work to substantially reduce the income gap between rich and poor."

Much of the appeal of the fiscally conservative Gov. Jerry Brown of California (and perhaps of Jimmy Carter) can be similarly explained, especially when the regressive nature of state and local taxation is taken into account. Roger Herriot and Herman P. Miller of the U.S. Census Bureau showed that, in 1968, state and local property and sales taxes took 12.1% of the incomes of those earning from $6,000 to $8,000. The figure drops to 9.9% for those at the national median income range of $10,000 to $15,000, and to 6.7% for those with incomes above $50,000. While it is not nearly so regressive, the federal income tax has almost no net redistributive effect, and the Social Security bite is even more regressive than are state and local taxation.

The standard of living of the average family has been falling during the 1970s, with wage increases failing to match an inflation rate unprecedented in the United States. Economists have found taxes, particularly state and local taxes, to be among the fastest rising components of that inflation. It is hardly surprising, then, that many

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citizens have come to regard government spending as a direct attack on their living standards. To add insult to injury, the government that has been unfairly taxing the lower economic strata has still not addressed their policy priorities. And it has been rotting with corruption at the same time.

It would be well for media pundits to remember that this country has not had a liberal President for at least eight years; indeed, it has had two very conservative ones who have successfully blocked liberal innovations. And, if people are reacting against "big" government, they are certainly not reacting against one characterized by a Congress which, though occasionally liberal in word, is impotent in deed.

But what about the Presidential primary results? If the country is not undergoing a conservative shift, why were domestically liberal Democrats like Bayh, Jackson, Shriver and Udall flattened by the Carter juggernaut? Partially, perhaps, because they were unable to see that it is not enough to call for more and better government programs; you must at the same time radically attack a tax system that makes the middle- and working-class majority pay disproportionately for such programs.

More important is the inclusion of *all* Washington politicians in the massive net of distrust that has been cast around government in the last decade. This alienation is the second major phenomenon that many journalists have confused with conservatism. Depending on the measure used, from one-half to three-quarters of the citizenry no longer exhibit much faith that government responds to the will of the people. A February *Newsweek* study found, for example, that just 32% of those who answered said they could trust the government in Washington "to do what is right" all or most of the time.

Into this situation steps Jimmy Carter. As an outsider, Carter is less likely to be the object of the distrust that most people feel for Washington politicians and especially for the very Congress which spawned most of the Democratic candidates. Carter's candidacy feeds from the same springs of alienation that nourished Eugene McCarthy, George McGovern—and George Wallace. Prof. Arthur H. Miller of the University of Michigan has shown that such political distrust arises from both liberal and conservative frustration with government policies. And, according to *Times* and *Washington Post* studies, Carter's appeal spans the ideological spectrum, tapping a range of anti-government feeling. Since the complaints Professor Miller found to be the basis of right-wing alienation (largely government overattention to minorities and failure to persevere in Vietnam) seem if anything less potent now than in the earlier part of the decade, it would be a serious mistake to overemphasize the degree to which Carter victories reflect purely conservative alienation. Indeed, a nationwide *Times* survey found that as many Carter supporters (37%) as Udall backers (38%) called themselves liberals! The former Governor's vague stands on issues—neither clearly nor consistently liberal or conservative—are not what have won him many votes in any case.

When one looks carefully at primary statistics, the absence of evidence for any clear-cut conservative trend from the Carter phenomenon becomes clearer. From one-half to three-quarters and more of the country's registered voters did not vote in the primaries. In the March 16th Illinois primary, 35% turned out; in New York the figure was under 20%; in Pennsylvania it grew to a relatively high 48%—still less than half of all Democratic registrants. Add to this the fact that, as of November 1972, fully 27.7% of the eligible adult population was not even registered, and media analyses of primary results become even more suspect.

Participation in national elections too has been declining steadily since 1960, and a February 1st *New York Times* analysis suggests that as much as half of the voting-age population may sit out the 1976 election; that would be the highest score for apathy since 1924. While there are a number of reasons for this, the prime cause most experts see is that same citizen distrust—the widespread feeling that politicians are not honestly responding to the public's real concerns.

Failure to vote in November will be concentrated among the young, the poor and the ill-educated—groups that tend on "welfare state" issues to be more liberal than the electorate as a whole. Levels of participation for the college-educated, who tend to be more conservative and Republican, have remained relatively high.

If our previous analysis is right, it points a clear course for Jimmy Carter and the rest of the Democratic ticket, as well as for journalists who wish to stop misleading the public about the state of its own political attitudes.

People will not go to the polls to vote for candidates who do not address their pressing needs in a credible way. Public priorities in this time of massive economic dislocation are just what they've been for years: the people want the government and the economy to provide them with security *and* equitable treatment. In their alienation from government officials, the people are not expressing a desire to be rid of government; rather they are expressing disgust with a government that has misrepresented and neglected their desires—and charged them more and more money for doing so.

It would be a tragic mistake for Democratic nominees to accept the media-created notion of a massive public desire to roll back government activism. A Democratic campaign based on that premise is doomed. There is no such "conservative" trend except among the dwindling Republican primary electorate—which has been conservative all along—and perhaps among some disillusioned academics and intellectuals whose aggressive push for neo-conservatism (see Entman review, "What the Neo-Conservatives Prescribe for Us," *The Nation,* January 3-10, 1976) is probably the original source of the media phantom.

If we arrive at November after a campaign in which Carter and Ford exchange clichés about "honesty" and "big government," then much of the disaffected, largely liberal majority will stay home on Election Day. The election will be abandoned to the more conservative segment of the public; such a truncated electorate will naturally gravitate to a conservative Republican incumbent

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and give Ford a victory. A Carter-Reagan race fought over such burning issues as the Panama Canal would have the same effect.

Though Carter seems confident of victory, both he and Democratic candidates at all levels—if they want to win a governing majority—must activate those who would otherwise fail to vote. From the head of the ticket down, Democrats should stress a continued and even expanded government activism that would deal with long-standing public priorities in the ways we've suggested. They would be wise to point out that the needs for economic security, broadly defined, that dominate those priorities require a combination of actions. Some, such as national health care, would indeed involve more government spending; others, such as an end to subsidies for monopolistic businesses, less government spending. Still others, such as truly progressive taxation (also needed to prevent the inflation feared by so many) and effective regulatory agencies, would require a change in government activity, not necessarily more of it. At the same time, the Democrats must stay away from the symbolic emotional issues —acid, amnesty, busing, etc.—with which the media defeated McGovern last time.

In the absence of such a strategy, we shall all gather around our television sets on election night to hear pundits attribute the GOP victory to a chimerical "conservative mood." Once again, the public's needs and expressed desires will have been misrepresented, both by the media and by the electoral process which the media purport merely to describe. □

REPORT FROM LUANDA

A NEW ANGOLAN SOCIETY

KEVIN BROWN

Recent news reports on Angola naturally tended to focus on the military aspects of the civil war or its implications for U.S. foreign policy. Now that the conflict there has been largely resolved and the MPLA's Luanda-based People's Republic of Angola is receiving diplomatic recognition from Western governments, it is time to turn attention to the less dramatic but no less important developments that have been taking place since the formation of the transition government in January of last year. For the ten months preceding independence on November 11, 1975, I was a graduate student living in Luanda and observed at first hand during that turbulent period the nation-building activities of the MPLA, the liberation movement whose ideology and program will profoundly affect the future of Angola. I am convinced that the foundations of a new Angolan society have already been established and that, despite the experimental nature of much that has been accomplished, the general outlines of the radical transformation now in progress can be observed.

The debate in this country over the government's involvement in Angola tended to obsure rather than clarify the complexities of the Angolan civil war. When Secretary of State Kissinger attempted to justify covert aid to the FNLA and UNITA by characterizing them as "pro-Western" and "anti-Communist" he erroneously injected an ideological element where none really existed. The Angolan civil war was not a miniature East-West confrontation but an internal power struggle between rival tribal groups whose interest in ideology is comparatively recent. The Mbundu and Bakongo peoples, bitter rivals today under the banners of their respective liberation movements, the MPLA and the FNLA, have been fighting each other intermittently since the beginning of the slave trade in Angola. The animosity is so deep that even a fourteen-year guerrilla war against their common enemy, the Portuguese colonial regime, failed to bridge their ethno-linguistic differences. Indeed, it is only a slight exaggeration to argue that the Angolan civil war actually began in 1961 with the outbreak of the liberation struggle, inasmuch as the MPLA and the FNLA (and after 1966, UNITA) often fought each other more than they did the Portuguese.

It is true that the three movements attempted to exploit the East-West rivalry to garner military aid and it is also true that the MPLA triumphed after receiving massive amounts of such aid from the USSR and Cuba. Yet the MPLA's victory is by no means a victory for communism nor would the United States necessarily have gained concessions if the FNLA/UNITA coalition had won. The Angolan movements are above all nationalistic, and dedicated to the elimination of all forms of foreign domination. As far as the MPLA is concerned, its ideology is best described as African socialism, with the emphasis on "African" to the extent that it represents an adaptation of classical European Marxism to the African situation. While the MPLA accepts the Marxist view of the world as divided between the capitalist exploiters and the proletarian exploited, it substitutes for the concepts of the class struggle and private property the concept of African autonomy: political, economic and cultural. The colonial experience taught the MPLA leadership that the crucial issue is not whether the means of production are owned publicly or privately but that they be controlled by Africans who are free of colonial and neo-colonial attitudes.

Thus the program the MPLA intends to implement sounds much like the typical platform of a European social democratic party. It calls for a republican, secular and democratic regime with independent legislative and executive branches; state control of basic industries and energy resources, with provision for private commercial

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activity, foreign or domestic, as long as African interests are served; education and social welfare facilities for all Angolans. In short, there is nothing obviously "communistic" about the MPLA's program. Whether or not the new Angolan society eventually turns Communist is another matter, but there is no ideological predisposition for such an outcome.

It is one of the ironies of Angolan history that the April 1974 coup in Portugal which signaled the demise of the Portuguese colonial empire, came at a time when the liberation struggle was at the nadir of its effectiveness. The three movements, fighting among themselves and consequently incapable of more than mild harassment of the Portuguese Army, appeared to be further than ever from their objective of an independent Angola. For the MPLA, the situation was particularly grave; an internal factional dispute, compounded by the Soviet Union's decision to suspend aid because of disenchantment with the MPLA's poor showing against the Portuguese, threatened its very survival. The dispute involved charges by the leaders of two factions that President Agostinho Neto had subverted the democratic principles of the MPLA by refusing to delegate authority and acting in a dictatorial manner.

Daniel Chipenda, an Ovimbundu and leader of the "Revolt of the West" faction, eventually defected to the FNLA, along with several hundred of the MPLA's best guerrillas; the "Active Revolt," led by the Andrade brothers, chose to dissociate themselves from Neto while nominally remaining within the movement. The latter faction is composed mostly of *mestiço* intellectuals who had played a prominent role in the MPLA since its inception in 1956. Although Neto survived this challenge to his control and emerged as the recognized leader who would represent the MPLA in decolonization negotiations with the Portuguese, the rift with the Active Revolt continues to be a source of tension and could be a factor in future power struggles within the MPLA.

If Neto's organization entered the period of transition to independence somewhat shakily, it nevertheless had certain advantages over the other movements. First, the MPLA's long-standing ties with the Portuguese Left secured it preferential treatment from army and government officials, many of whom openly sided with the MPLA against its rivals. Second, it had the advantage of fighting in its own tribal area during the battle for control of Luanda. Third, and most important, the Soviet Union and Cuba were willing to provide almost unlimited support in advisers and materiel, in sharp contrast to the United States aid to FNLA/UNITA which never matched what the MPLA received either in quality or quantity. MPLA's edge in military hardware ultimately proved decisive in winning the civil war, but at the inauguration of the transition government in January 1975, victory was by no means a foregone conclusion. Soviet arms (Cuban "advisers" arrived in force in June) did no more than permit the MPLA to hold its own against the FNLA in the battle for Luanda.

The transition government, designed to facilitate an orderly transfer of power to the three movements, was a disaster from the start. Everybody shares the blame for the debacle: the Portuguese, for having done little to prepare the colony for independence; and the three movements for having failed to end their internecine quarrel during the fifteen years of the liberation struggle. About the only positive thing to be said of the transition government is that it is unique in the annals of African decolonization. Nothing so complex had heretofore been created. The four interested parties divided up twelve ministries more or less evenly, the more sensitive ones such as Interior (police) and Information being equipped with watchdog secretaries from the rival movements. At the top, the movements rotated the Premiership monthly, while the Portuguese High Commissioner sought to insure the observance of the provisions of the Alvor Accords, which were the legal basis for the government. This cumbersome, unwieldy structure guaranteed that bureaucratic infighting would replace effective administration, an unpromising situation that proved fatal because of the presence in Luanda of four mutually hostile armies, each itching for an opportunity to settle old scores.

The explosion came in late March and for the next four months Luandans lived in a nightmare. As many as 10,000 Africans may have died in the cross fire of machine guns, mortars and rocket-propelled grenades that caught them defenseless in their fragile tin-roofed huts. Between outbreaks of heavy fighting that flared up with depressing regularity, first in the African *musseques* or shantytowns and later in the white neighborhoods, Luandans were subjected to individual acts of terrorism. Known supporters of the movements daily ran the risk of robbery, rape, kidnap and assassination. A *mestiço* friend of mine, himself the victim of an FNLA kidnapping, described the atmosphere in the *musseques* as a "human rabbit hunt."

Repeated attempts to resolve this state of unofficial civil war foundered upon the conflicting strategic interests of the two main antagonists: the MPLA and FNLA. For the FNLA, a firm foothold in Luanda was essential if it hoped eventually to control Angola. However the lack of tribal support there, where the Bakongos accounted for only 10 per cent of the population, dictated a policy of aggressive recruitment to overcome the minimal disadvantage. The tactics adopted included sparing no expense for transportation, entertainment and the distribution of clothing emblazoned with the FNLA insignia and colors. Meanwhile, military posts were carefully located provocatively close to those of the MPLA, in an attempt to convince the people that the FNLA's tough-looking, well-armed troops offered better protection than did the ragtag MPLA forces.

The MPLA had to respond to this challenge by demonstrating its capacity to defend its supporters against the incursions of this "foreign invader." And so in July, the MPLA mounted against the FNLA posts in Luanda a series of offenses aimed at running them out of town. It is unclear just why the MPLA thought it necessary to antagonize UNITA at the same time (UNITA had taken a neutral stance until then, with its leader, Jonas Savimbi, acting as mediator between Holden Roberto of FNLA and Neto) but it is apparently true that during June and July, the MPLA killed 300 UNITA troops,

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thereby forcing Savimbi into a reluctant alliance with Roberto. In any case, by August, the MPLA could claim complete control of Luanda and the civil war was officially declared.

The significance of the MPLA *coup d'état*, as far as the majority of Luandans were concerned, was not that the transition government had collapsed but rather that the fighting in the city had ceased. The sense of relief was palpable. With the 9 P.M. curfew lifted, people could move about the city without fear of roadblocks or ambushes; it was again possible to visit one's friends and perhaps to move back to an evacuated house. For the MPLA, the expulsion from Luanda of its rivals meant that for the first time since the end of the colonial war it controlled its own tribal area and could therefore proceed unhampered with the implementation of the revolutionary program.

The central theme of the MPLA's ideology is *poder popular* (people's power). It has always been the MPLA's stated goal to establish an independent Angola based on the premise that the source of power and legitimacy in the government will be the people. In Luanda at least, the institution chosen to transform this revolutionary ideal into practical reality is the Comissao de Bairro, or neighborhood committee. Under the Portuguese, these committees operated as local administrative units for the colonial regime; accordingly, they were not particularly responsive to the needs of the African population. The MPLA's innovation has been to recast the committees into popularly elected bodies with a mandate to reorganize and reorient life in the neighborhoods, and at the same time to provide essential social services. In organizational structure, the committees are carbon copies of the MPLA. For example, the committee operating in Sambizanga, an especially large *musseque*, is divided into the following departments: the organization of the masses; information and propaganda; political orientation; supply and provisions; social affairs; health, and a coordinating group.

Although the officials of Sambizanga deny any link with the MPLA and claim complete autonomy of operation, the separation is theoretical. As the departmental breakdown indicates, the committee functions as the local mobilization arm of the MPLA, and while it is difficult to pinpoint exactly the lines of authority, clearly the committee is not an independent entity.

Underlying all mobilization activities is the conviction that the masses must be "mentalized" or re-educated for the task of building a new society. A recurrring theme in President Neto's writings is the idea that Portuguese colonialism not only oppressed Angolans politically and economically but culturally; therefore, a political revolution without a corresponding cultural revolution would be a hollow achievement. Neto states: "To construct a country does not mean simply to build houses or open roads; rather it is essentially to transform the mentality of the human being in order that he might consider himself a dignified individual, useful to society." A major objective of "mentalization" is to instill a more cooperative spirit in the approach to work, to motivate workers to labor for the betterment of Angola. The committee's role in this regard is to combine intensive propaganda with organizational guidance in such self-help activities as the improvement of sanitary conditions and the formation of cooperatives.

The Sambizanga food cooperative illustrates the practical way the MPLA is trying simultaneously to educate and mobilize the residents of the neighborhood. Even though the co-op is restricted for the moment to distributing essential foodstuffs: beans, rice, manioc flour, beer and soft drinks, it competes directly with the *cantineiros*, or food-store owners, who often charge more than the official prices. By shopping at the co-op, members are assured of legal prices and have a chance to strike back at speculators. Thus they are learning that



Wendy Holmes

Downtown Luanda: May 1975

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collectively they can improve their lot, which is one aspect of *poder popular*. Of course there have been problems; in spite of the overall success of committee-run co-ops, there have been instances of corruption and some officials landed in jail. The widespread food shortages resulting from the civil war created many opportunities for speculation in the distribution of scarce commodities. However, the MPLA's swift response has restored confidence in its commitment to fair, effective administration.

In a country where the Portuguese kept 90 per cent of the population illiterate and where social services for Africans were almost entirely neglected, the committees face an enormous task. Because the needs of the people are so vast, there is no restriction on the scope of their activities—and they are broad indeed. At its most basic, the committee may act as counselor to local residents with personal problems or it may refer them to governmental agencies. Many committees offer working adults evening literacy classes, along with instruction in hygiene, child care, African history and sometimes English. In rare instances, a committee may act as a pressure group to organize opinion on a particular issue—for example, film censorship. I participated in the initial stages of an attempt by the Ministry of Culture, undertaken in response to the loud outcry of one committee, to establish guidelines for censoring sex and violence in films. I am not sure what impressed me more: the public pressure generated by the committee or the undogmatic, careful attitude with which the MPLA approached the problem. The committees, then, are capable of exerting influence far beyond the boundaries of the neighborhood and there is apparently no limit to the range of their interests.

Concern about importing "decadent Western culture" was one manifestation of a moderately puritanical streak in the MPLA, also expressed in exhortations to avoid partying, drunkenness and other unproductive activities. Yet the MPLA's appeals for more work and less play derived more from necessity than from revolutionary fervor; it was a question of survival. While the economic crisis which the MPLA faced as independence approached can in part be blamed on the mass exodus of the Portuguese, the unwillingness of African workers to produce at prerevolution levels was also an important factor. A possible explanation for their low productivity may be that the workers, conditioned by years of virtual forced labor devoid of any incentive beyond the threat of starvation, had not yet adjusted to their new freedoms as unionized laborers and therefore took advantage of them. Whatever the reason, the consequence was a series of bottlenecks in many sectors of the economy, the most glaring of which was the port of Luanda.

Although they had become the highest paid on the West African coast, the stevedores last year handled barely 20 per cent of the tonnage of the previous year. Almost the only goods that moved with dispatch through the port were the arms shipments from the Soviet Union and Eastern bloc countries. Ships suffered delays of many months, waiting to unload imports of vital foodstuffs and to take on coffee, a major source of foreign exchange. To combat the wave of wildcat strikes, slowdowns and work stoppages, in the main unjustified, the MPLA undertook a vigorous propaganda campaign urging workers to set aside their grievances for the greater good of the new Angola. Slogans such as: "To produce is to resist" and "There is no revolution without production" bombarded the city from posters, newspapers, radio and television, while the MPLA leaders hammered away at the theme in mass rallies.

Television, very much in the experimental stage when I left Angola last November, will undoubtedly be employed more extensively as a propaganda medium. Sets were distributed to the committees when daily programs began in October, an indication that the MPLA plans to exploit TV as far as possible. The programs I saw consisted mainly of news reports, heavily laced with diatribes against the FNLA/UNITA coalition and supplemented by an occasional documentary on African peoples and culture. Presumably, systematic educational and propagandistic programming will in time become standard fare, but the first night of Angolan television will be hard to surpass—*Viva Zapata* with Marlon Brando and Anthony Quinn was shown, complete with commentary on the development of a political consciousness among the Mexican peasants and its relevance to the Angolan revolution.

It is hard to judge how effective the MPLA's "mentalization" campaign has been so far. I found the average Luandan surprisingly sophisticated in the use of MPLA political rhetoric and always willing to discuss the Angolan situation, particularly with foreigners. Hitchhikers, upon learning that I was an American, would invariably challenge me to justify "U.S. imperialist" activity in Angola. In discussions with MPLA political commissars who are responsible for the indoctrination of recruits to the FAPLA (the military wing of the MPLA), I was especially impressed by how little their revolutionary dogma blinded them to the realities of the civil war. They readily acknowledged and sought to overcome tribal resistance to their movement in such regions as Cabinda, where they eventually succeeded in earning the respect if not the love of the Cabindans. The FNLA soldiers, on the other hand, were led to believe that Luandans would welcome them as conquering heroes; when instead they encountered hostility, they quickly became demoralized.

Yet these admittedly superficial observations should not suggest that the MPLA will easily overcome tribal divisions and forge a unified Angola in the near future. On the contrary, it is as yet by no means in complete control of even its own supporters, and much will depend upon its ability to discipline its militants, specifically the FAPLA and the local militia, to the end of winning the confidence of other tribal groups. In August a year ago an incident that occurred in Luanda gave the MPLA a chance to demonstrate its commitment to strict discipline. At the height of the battle for Luanda in July, the MPLA had hastily armed neighborhood defense forces to help drive the FNLA from the city. After the battle, these ill-trained militia retained their weapons and began a rampage of looting in the *musseques*. Six members of a defense force led by a FAPLA commander named Bom dos Boms (a *nom de guerre* meaning, literally, the good of the good ones) who had been a guerrilla since 1959, massacred eleven men, women and children after a Satur-

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day night spree. The following Wednesday the MPLA staged a public trial and invited the crowd to render the verdict. Unimpressed by the defendants' testimony, the crowd shouted "guilty." An execution by firing squad followed immediately. Broadcast live over the radio, this dramatic trial electrified the city: it was an unequivocal message that the MPLA would not tolerate lawlessness within its ranks.

Turning to the future, the immediate question is: has the MPLA really won the civil war? I think it has. Though it is theoretically feasible for the FNLA/UNITA coalition to continue a guerrilla struggle, in practical terms they have little hope because they have no sanctuary outside of Angola from which to operate. The recent nonaggression pact between Neto and President Mobutu of Zaïre eliminates that possibility, and Zambia is too dependent on the Benguela Railway outlet to the Atlantic to jeopardize access to it. That leaves South Africa, another unlikely choice in view of its professed willingness to negotiate with the MPLA over the Cunene River project on Angola's border with South West Africa. In short, the FNLA and UNITA have few friends willing to shoulder the risk and expense involved in supporting further fighting.

Notwithstanding Roberto's and Savimbi's severe logistical problems, much will depend on how successful the MPLA is in winning the peace. The Bakongo and the Ovimbundu peoples (the latter is the largest single tribe in Angola) will have to be convinced that a government dominated by the MPLA is a reasonable alternative to the prolongation of the civil war. This could be accomplished if the MPLA pursues a magnanimous, no-reprisal policy, coupled with the restoration of security and an adequate food supply. Over the longer term, the MPLA will have to devise a way to include its rivals in the government. The MPLA's prospects of an accommodation with UNITA are better than they are with the FNLA, since historically there has been less tribal animosity between the Mbundu and Ovimbundu peoples. In the midst of the fighting last fall, representatives from the MPLA and UNITA met in Lisbon for talks. They failed, but nevertheless it was an encouraging sign.

Western governments have expressed the fear that the MPLA, in payment for Soviet and Cuban aid, will permit the establishment of a Soviet naval base and allow the Cubans to spread revolution into southern Africa. Both developments are highly improbable. The MPLA has no desire to become involved in big-power rivalries, and there is no reason why it should not follow Mozambique's nationalist stance and deny the Russians a naval facility. The Cubans, having already fared badly against South African troops in Angola, would be foolhardy to take on South Africa or Rhodesia directly. Moreover, the MPLA is too preoccupied with asserting control over Angola to be actively engaged in spreading revolution elsewhere. It is more likely that Soviet and Cuban military advisers will remain in Angola to train an army once the threat of UNITA guerrilla activity is removed.

As far as internal politics is concerned, I would be surprised if radical changes in the MPLA power structure took place in the near future. Neto's position appears unassailably strong. Opposition from the Active Revolt will have a chance to express itself only when and if elections are held within the movement; still, the moderate democratic philosophy of this faction is popular, particularly among the more educated members of the MPLA, who may be called on to serve in the government. The most likely source of a new thrust for power is within Neto's own circle of loyal followers and the man to watch there is Nito Alves.

A dynamic public speaker, he possesses a Populist touch conspicuously lacking in Neto's personality. Alves is little known outside Angola, where he distinguished himself as a guerrilla leader in the liberation war, but he has a solid base among the common soldiers with whom he shared the trials of bush fighting. Even the way he speaks Portuguese sets him apart from the rest of the European-educated leadership—he is unmistakably a man of the people. Therefore, his appointment as Minister of the Interior in the new government, where he can combine control of the police force with his popularity among the FAPLA, makes him the single most powerful man in the MPLA hierarchy after Neto.

Some observers consider Alves's appointment the first step toward a police state, similar to what seems to be happening in Mozambique, where Samora Machel's private secret police might well be the foundation for a personal dictatorship. While granting that the danger exists, I believe it is still too early to say which way the MPLA is headed and, further, that the appointment of Alves to Interior was designed to cope with a serious rift between the police and the FAPLA. There have been reports of open confrontation between the two forces in connection with police attempts to curb rampant housebreaking and auto theft, often perpetrated by the FAPLA, who apparently can't resist the temptation to supplement their meager salaries by "expropriating" goods.

Another potentially ominous implication of the Alves rise to power is the possibility of a backlash against the *mestiço* community, that racial and cultural by-product of centuries of Portuguese-African contact. Because of their often privileged position in the colonial regime, *mestiços* were the focus of a black African resentment that could flare up anew. Despite MPLA propaganda and despite the presence of *mestiços* in key posts in the government and movement hierarchy, several *mestiços* have voiced to me concern about their future in Angola. If they are eliminated from positions of influence, Angola could easily become another Mozambique—that is, a nation sealed off to all but the Communist countries. In general, the *mestiço* community, as represented by the Active Revolt faction of the MPLA, favors a policy of nonalignment in foreign relations that would permit Western business interests to operate in Angola. Should the Alves faction prevail in a power struggle, a more exclusively pro-Soviet policy would emerge, effectively closing the door to the West. At the moment, these hard-liners appear to be gaining ground in Luanda, but as yet there are no clear signals as to the ultimate direction of the Angolan revolution. What has been accomplished to date in terms of the mobilization and "mentalization" of the Angolan people could just as easily form the foundation of a democratic Socialist regime as of a totalitarian dictatorship. □

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Condor: The Missile Nobody Wants

FRED KAPLAN

Once the blueprints are drawn, it is very difficult—indeed, it usually proves impossible—to cancel a new weapons system that the Army, Navy or Air Force thinks would contribute to the image of American might or meet one of those novel combat situations which the military imagination is so fertile at inventing. It is understandable—the Pentagon is a badly spoiled bureaucracy; it wants its toys and it will throw a tantrum if it doesn't get them. But what may not be understandable to the civilian, tax-paying mind is that it is almost as difficult to cancel a new weapons system that *nobody* wants, once a defense contractor has drawn up its preliminary plans and set the gears of its public relations furiously spinning. The defense industry has only one customer; accordingly it is the most bitterly competitive business in the country. Take, for example, the Navy's Condor missile, product of Rockwell International Corp. After a thirteen-year history of malfunctions, delays and cost overruns, the $569.9-million Condor is another boondoggle moving into the final production stages. At a meeting of the Pentagon's Defense Systems Acquisition Review Committee (DSARC) last September, it was recommended to Deputy Secretary of Defense William Clements Jr. that the Navy subject Condor to further tests. On June 8, a Pentagon "principals only" program review committee (restricted to directors and their principal deputies) approved a memorandum urging Clements and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld to approve production of Condor, as the missile had proved successful on most of the tests made. On June 10, Clements officially approved.

This decision, however, should lead no one to assume that Condor is a weapon that the United States should procure—or even that it works. For background, it is useful to examine the cast of characters that pushed Condor through the Pentagon.

Condor's chief promoter is Dr. Malcolm R. Currie, director of Defense research and engineering, director of Defense development and acquisition, and chairman of a steering committee on relations between contractors and the DoD. Currie spent last Labor Day weekend at a Bahamas fishing lodge owned by Rockwell International, prime contractor on Condor (and on the B-1). Once back in Washington, Currie began praising the wonders of Condor. When Rockwell International released information regarding his vacation, it seemed clear that Currie had violated recent Department of Defense conflict-of-interest regulations. His behavior was also contrary to the Standards of Conduct Law for Pentagon personnel, which states, in part: "Even though a technical conflict, as set forth in the statutes cited in this part, may not exist, DoD personnel must avoid the appearance of such a conflict from a public confidence point of view." (32 USC Sec. 40.735-3.)

At the least, Currie's actions violated "public confidence." He "remorsefully" regretted his "bad judgment," and Rumsfeld docked him four weeks' pay, an extraordinary disciplinary measure. (But Rumsfeld's indignation seems to have been short-lived. Just weeks after the reprimand, Currie, who until then had been merely in charge of research and engineering, was promoted to head development and acquisition as well.) Furthermore, Currie, who is chairman of DSARC III, the review committee on weapons production, removed himself from the particular DSARC dealing with Condor. Although he denied wrongdoing in his Rockwell connection, he felt that his departure was the best way to take the heat off the missile. (See editorial, "The Brazen Warriors," *The Nation*, June 19.)

However, the careers of Currie's hand-picked replacements for the DSARC—his principal deputy, Robert N. Parker, and his deputy on tactical warfare, William E. Stoney—might be even more damaging to public confidence on Rockwell-related matters, especially on Condor. Parker worked for the Hughes Aircraft Company from 1954 to 1967. (Hughes—for which Currie also worked for fifteen years, at one point as corporate vice president and manager of research and development—manufactures the data links on Condor; it has a lot of money riding on the project.) From 1967 to 1970, Parker was chief engineer of Rockwell International's Autonetics Division, which designs missile systems and missile-related electronics.

Stoney has even closer attachments. From 1953 to 1972 he was executive vice president of Rockwell International's Autonetics. After taking a year's leave of absence, he was from 1973 to 1974 executive adviser to the president of Rockwell International's Microelectronics Division. Malcolm Currie hired Parker as his principal deputy for research and engineering in August 1973; Parker brought in his friend Stoney in October 1975. It is suspected among many in the executive branch of the government that both men were hired to get two major Rockwell items into production—the B-1 bomber and Condor. It was Parker and Stoney who wrote the decisive memo for the "principals only" meeting that recommended the Condor go-ahead. They wrote it prior to the meeting.

The memo itself was hardly comprehensive. It was based strictly on Condor's performance in special "reliability" testing, which checks electronics components, missile engines and other launch and pre-launch aspects of a weapon. Reliability flaws can be detected before takeoff and can usually be patched up with no great difficulty. But of Condor's vulnerability, utility, operational suitability and cost effectiveness there has never been any actual, realistic testing at all.

Condor's mission is to destroy high value tactical targets, such as ships and shore installations, from as far away as 60 miles. Yet Condor's warheads weigh less than 650 pounds—even lighter (and technologically no more impressive) than those of the junked Walleye I missile, which was to attack tactical targets in Vietnam until the

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Air Force discovered that its 800-pound warhead could not even completely destroy a bridge. (It has now been replaced by the Walleye II, which delivers a 2,000-pound warhead.) If the tactical targets to be hit by Condor were similar to those attacked in Vietnam or the Middle East, its warheads would certainly be inadequate for the task.

Moreover, Condor is a fair-weather missile. It is guided by a television system controlled by the pilots in the launching plane. Such a system's ability to discriminate objects against a background is very low, much lower than even the human eye. If Condor is to hit its target, its pilots must first see the target on their TV screens. Visibility must be very good with little or no haze, smoke, fog or thick clouds; the target must have high contrast to its background; and it must be attacked in daytime. Since most major tactical targets are camouflaged, since many enemy forces are adept at creating smoke screens, and since the weather varies, Condor's war capability is questionable.

Furthermore, most targets worth destroying are surrounded by various defense systems. Since Condor has no adequate radar detection system, its pilots would not even know when it was being attacked. The defense capability of the weapon, in other words, approaches zero. Condor advocates counter this criticism by noting its ability to fire with precision from a distance of 60 miles. Two problems arise here. First, a 60-mile range does not protect Condor from surface-to-air missile (SAM) attack. Second, it is likely that Condor would have first to penetrate defense systems—perhaps air defense systems—around the target, a task for which it has no design capability. Nobody knows for sure what would happen if Condor attacked a defended target. The Navy's commander operational test and evaluation force demanded twice last year that Condor be tested against defense missiles and against attempts to jam Condor's communications system, another shortcoming. The demand in both cases was overruled by the chief of naval operations.

Instead, DSARC relied on a computer-based study made by Principia, Inc., a Virginia consulting firm that offered its services to Condor program manager Captain Z. Kowalskey after hearing that the missile needed testing beyond mere "reliability" checks. The offer came from Principia's founder and board chairman, Allen Simon, a former assistant director of defense research and engineering under Malcolm Currie. Simon is also a member of another Virginia consulting firm—Davis, Fubini, Simon and Kent. Among his regular clients is Rockwell International, and among the projects on which he advised is Condor. One government official who knows of this arrangement describes it as "corruption at its worst." Simon denies having worked at all on the Condor study (a claim that some of his former Pentagon colleagues dispute); but, notes the government official, "If a man controls an organization, he in effect controls its products. . . . It is absolutely improper to work for the Navy and the contractor on the same project. It smells rotten."

The study's substance is even shakier than its genesis. According to a partly declassified letter written by Sen. Thomas Eagleton (D., Mo.), a General Accounting Office



Vadillo, El Sol de Mexico

(GAO) audit reports that Principia employed dubious methodology and came to conclusions contrary to much of the study's own data. The tactical scenarios assessed the technical capability of the enemy in such a way as to be most favorable to Condor. The targets selected minimized the vulnerability of Condor, as compared to the Air Force's electro-optically guided bomb (EOGB) and its Walleye II, the two weapons against which Condor was being judged. Condor does have some self-protective "stand-off" superiority to EOGB and Walleye II, but GAO found this advantage highly exaggerated. Condor's defense capability was overrated, EOGB's and Walleye II's underrated. Principia also vastly underrated the attrition rate of Condor's launching aircraft (relative to Walleye II). Even so, according to the GAO audit, at the assumed rate aircraft-replacement costs would be so high as to rule out the purchase of Condor.

The costs question is devastating. The unit price for a Condor has been estimated by the Navy at $417,561. By comparison, Air Force glide bombs, which can perform missions similar to Condor's in all kinds of weather, day or night, cost only $70,000 each. Walleye II, a weapon similar to Condor, with slightly shorter range but warheads nearly four times as powerful, costs $28,000, according to the Navy's budget request. The IIR Maverick, with capabilities similar to the glide bombs, can be had for $12,000. The EOGB runs $50,000 per unit. (Captain Kowalskey, trying to promote Condor on the grounds of cost effectiveness, absurdly asserted that Walleye II's unit cost was $153,000, and put EOGB's at $82,900. Neither Principia nor DSARC bothered to do any cost-effectiveness evaluation at all.)

And aside from all its inadequacies, Condor is destined to be a superfluous weapon. In the period when Condor was being tested and developed, the Navy started and completed the Harpoon, a program with an identical

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mission and greater capability. The Harpoon is surface- and air-launchable, has greater range than does Condor, and is actively guided by radar, which means that it can be used whatever the environment or hour. It costs slightly less than Condor, and—by all reports—it works. As a result, all but a few in the Navy no longer even want Condor. As is customary with useless weapons, Condor's program managers are now looking for a new mission to keep the missile alive. The Air Force has come under strong pressure from people in Rumsfeld's office (OSD) to take it, but the Air Force has comparable weapons that it considers more useful and efficient. So its sponsors are currently trying to sell Condor as a land-target destroyer.

Significantly, Condor advocates within the Navy recently warned Senator Eagleton that if he continued to criticize Condor, the Harpoon program—manufactured by McDonnell Douglas in Eagleton's home state of Missouri—would be jeopardized. Naval officials have conceded that Harpoon is the better weapon, but Navy liaison told an Eagleton aide that "certain forces" (presumably Rockwell-linked) along with an "Ohio coalition" of legislators, could nonetheless kill the Harpoon. (Condor's development, fabrication, testing and evaluation have all been done at Rockwell's Columbus, Ohio plant.)

Despite the lack of adequate testing, Condor has received more promotion in the past four months than ever before. Much time and money have been spent on the missile—thirteen years and at least $250 million so far. Hundreds of millions more rest on getting the production wheels finally turning. Whenever this kind of money is poured into a program, the momentum is nearly impossible to stop. A constituency with vested interest emerges: the contracting service, in this case the Navy, even though it may no longer have any use for the weapon; the program manager, who has little hope of promotion if his program fails; former corporation executives within DoD——Currie, Parker and Stoney in this case; dozens of others in other cases—who have ties of affection, if nothing stronger, with their old companies. As one government official sums it up, "Everybody wins something except for the anonymous taxpayer, and who cares about him?"

The House recently passed a bill terminating Condor, and there is an almost even chance that the Senate might do the same in August. But Congress should not be so naive as to think that this pattern of inadequate testing, bureaucratic shuffling and dubious corporate connections applies only to a single weapon. These factors influence the direction of weapons procurement more often than the public imagines, even in its present mood of suspicion toward government. GAO and Congress should investigate these issues vigorously. Such action would only amount to a first step, but without it, chances for rational decision making in the weapons procurement process will almost always be eclipsed by the almost unstoppable—and, at times, nearly undetectable—forces of vested interests and bureaucratic inertia. □

The Olympics: Can Russia Lose?

YURI BROKHIN

If the image of Russia is associated with the clumsy, sleepy bear, it is certainly not so in the field of sports. Beginning in 1952, when the Soviet Union first appeared in the Olympics at Helsinki, and up to the latest competition at Innsbruck, the Russians have won 810 medals, more than any other nation in the world.

How have the Russians managed to beat the United States in such major and popular American sports as basketball, boxing, sprinting, the high jump, hockey and figure skating—along with the odd, fanatically pursued sport of weightlifting?

There are 250 million people in the Soviet Union, half of whom are involved in sports. They don't necessarily take part in competitions, nor are they subjected to compulsory physical exercises. They simply can't withstand the fascination of sports. Four circumstances have produced this mass preoccupation:

(*1*) Sports have been turned into a detour with which the Kremlin diverts people from their attempts to judge the moral values of their society. Three million athletic coaches with specialized secondary school training and 300,000 college-educated sports specialists invite persons of all ages and professions to come to the 100,000 first-rate Soviet sports complexes where, quite free of cost, they may run, jump, swim and play games—provided, of course, that they don't ask why Soviet tanks are firing in Angola, what freedom of speech is, or how the KGB operates.

(*2*) Today, Soviet journalism has almost exhausted the public's capacity to become absorbed in Marxist-Leninist doctrine. Therefore it turns to bombarding its readers and listeners with overseas news from the stadiums and tracks of the West. Surprisingly, such information is fairly accurate. The enemy must be seen and appreciated, in order to be beaten. That is why detailed reports of American sporting events, like those found in *The New York Times*, can also be read in *Soviet Sport, Komsomol'skaia Pravda* and *Trud*.

(*3*) The underlying aim of all sports activity is to prepare a powerful army. Every athlete is a potential soldier, ready at a moment to line up with 10 million other trained fighters like himself and to crawl across the Arctic ice packs, Saharan sands, or European meadows.

(*4*) In a period of détente international sporting arenas have become the testing ground for psychological confrontations between the USSR and the United States, i.e.,

Yuri Bkokhin, former Moscow screenwriter, author of Hustling on Gorky Street *(Dial Press), is writing a book about sports in the Soviet Union which will be published by Random House.*

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W. Carpenter Jr., Illustrated London News

between communism and capitalism. If Americans have not always seen games in that light, the Soviet Russians always have. The state pours money into sports, whether it is $25 million for the speed-skating complex "Medeo," or the $2,500 paid by the government to every athlete who sets a new record.

Naturally, all members of Soviet Olympic teams are dyed-in-the-wool professionals, receiving salary and allowances to perform their specialties. However, there are also millions of amateurs, as well as semi-pros, who comprise an almost unique layer in Soviet society. A gigantic machine called the State Committee of Sports relentlessly conducts competitions, does research, makes selections and catapults athletes into the orbits of the Olympic Games. But even while circling in these orbits the Russian star athletes remain quite independent human beings, far from the zealous defenders of Communist supremacy they are built up to be.

The gymnastics of Olga Korbut are a cascade of acrobatic stunts, stunts which are to her the most beautiful and dramatic adventures in life. If you look carefully at Valery Borzov, winner of two gold medals in Munich, you will see the face of an inspired artist who by coincidence finds himself in the company of sprinters. Ice-dancing champion Ludmila Pakhomova would, after every victory, stare straight into the TV camera and whisper "mama," knowing that not only her mama but everyone else would be captivated by the word.

In 1954 an American, Norbert Shemansky, lifted 200 kilograms. He had two assistants, his colleagues Imreach and Shepard. Shemansky took two minutes to lift the weight from the floor to the fixed position. People in the audience wept with pleasure and it was predicted by specialists that the new record would be broken only in the 21st century.

Six years later Yuri Vlasov, a Russian, lifted 202 kilograms. He was an intellectual who wanted to assert the glory of the human being against the brutality of the world and used the power of his arms and back to do so. In the late 1960s Leonid Zhabotinsky made his appearance, lifting 220 kilograms. He seemed to have stepped straight out of a masterpiece by Rubens, merely to play with barbells. Actually, behind him stood a small army of researchers, propelling him to this breakthrough in scientific sports.

Vasily Alexeev began weightlifting in 1971. Within five years he raised the ceiling to 252 kilograms, establishing seventy world records along the way. The most amazing thing is that Alexeev, the greatest weightlifter in history, had no trainer and was not acquainted with the science of contemporary achievements in weightlifting. He is a child of nature. He lumbers on stage like a bear from his den, lifts the weights and lumbers off again as if nothing had happened.

Before the beginning of the recent game with the New York Rangers two great Russian hockey forwards, Vladimir Petrov and Boris Mikhailov, did nothing all day but play chess. They played twenty-three matches until somebody stole the white Queen. Rising from the board, Petrov went out onto the rink, clobbered somebody over the head with his stick and scored two goals. In the locker room after the game, Coach Loktev went up to Petrov and handed him a gift—the white Queen. Petrov set up the pieces on a locker-room bench and immediately began the twenty-fourth match.

These are the stars of Soviet sports. They constitute a class of their own, although their status is at variance with the spirit of the collective society. From time to time the Soviet press conducts vigorous campaigns against their deviations from the norm: luxurious apartments, country homes, foreign cars, debauchery. But it is simply a verbal show for the masses, to reassure them that, under Soviet communism, everyone is equal.

In fact, even the KGB can't touch the sports celebrities. Some of the Soviet sports professionals are involved in black marketeering, their level of operation varying in seeming parallel with their athletic prowess. If the bronze-medal winner packs away dozens of cans of ski wax ($1.99 per can in the West; resale value in Moscow $30 per can) between his skis, the gold-medal winner prefers gold coins and bars. There is a tacit understanding. The customs officials at Moscow International Airport know what is going on but avoid checking the baggage of the esteemed upholders of the athletic glory of the USSR. And that, as well as extraordinary privileges to travel abroad, is what particularly attracts the economically oriented Russian youth to the opportunities of sport.

In a few more weeks full-time Soviet Olympic athletes will begin battle, mainly against American sporting moonlighters. Can the Russians lose? Hardly. □

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One of a series of reports on the first hundred years of the telephone.

Why the cost of telephone service has gone up less than the cost of almost anything else.

In the late 1920's, in a Chicago factory, the history of industrial relations reached a turning point. The plant, the Hawthorne Works of the Western Electric Company, made telephones and telephone equipment for the Bell System. And in 1927 its managers had a puzzle.

The Hawthorne Works of the Western Electric Company, scene of what one economist called "the most exciting and important study of factory workers ever made."

For more than two years the company had been studying plant lighting and its relation to efficiency. (It was the era of the "efficiency expert" and "scientific management.") Increases in illumination were followed by increases in production, as expected. But decreases in light levels were also followed by increases in production. Two young women even maintained good production under light no brighter than moonlight.

It became clear that light had only a minor effect, and that there were many other variables to be identified. To solve the puzzle, the company undertook a further study, carried on jointly with the Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration. The researchers selected a group of six competent, experienced women, explained what they were trying to do, and requested their cooperation. Over a period of twenty-six months, the researchers added rest periods and snacks to the group's work schedule, shortened the work day, and then returned to the original schedule. The group showed an almost unbroken rise in average hourly production and also in total weekly production, even when the week was five hours shorter than at the start. At the end, their production was 30 percent above the beginning level.

The Hawthorne Experiments made it clear that the "scientific management" theory of the day relied too heavily on methods borrowed from the physical sciences. Two major conclusions are widely accepted now, but then their application to factory work was new:

People work better when they feel they are part of a team.

People work better when they feel what they are doing is important.

Today most businesses are aware of "group dynamics" and "job enrichment." But the lessons of Hawthorne have shaped

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policy for many years, not just in Western Electric factories but in all parts of the Bell System. And the Bell System is still a leader in the exploration of factors affecting industrial productivity.

The prices of most telephone equipment made by Western Electric currently average 20 percent below the prices of other suppliers. Why?

New products for the Bell System are usually designed at Bell Laboratories, the research and development arm of the System. Bell Labs also sets quality standards. But at an early stage manufacturing engineers from Western Electric sit down with the designers and look for ways to save. All companies know that's the best time to cut costs; in the Bell System, that knowledge guides practice. The search for reduced costs continues after production begins. Every aspect of manufacturing is under constant reexamination. Western Electric's engineering cost reductions alone totaled $198 million in first-year savings in 1975.



An early improvement in Bell's 1876 laboratory model phone was the addition of a bell.

Yet none of these achievements would take place unless the people involved were convinced that it is important to produce good telephones at low cost. Phillip S. Babb of McKinsey and Co., management consultants, made this analysis in an interview published in the journal *International Management:*

> Western Electric has succeeded in making cost-cutting a central part of the ethos, the value system, by which their people live. Driving costs down—with retained high quality—is what they spend their working lives at. It is what they take their pride in. It is their way to the corporate top.

To put it another way, the business of the Bell System is providing good telephone service at reasonable cost; Western Electric's activities are directed toward that service goal, rather than toward simply making products.

That service goal characterizes all parts of the Bell System, including the twenty-three regional operating companies and the Long Lines Department. All the parts work closely together to achieve that goal, and all benefit as a result. The operating companies provide telephone service and report, through AT&T, to Bell Labs and Western Electric their needs and the needs of telephone users. Bell Labs and Western Electric design and manufacture equipment to meet known needs as well as the best estimates of expected needs. And the local companies are assured of having the products customers want. To use the vocabulary of the economist, vertical integration with organizational feedback enhances productivity throughout the Bell System.

Touche, Ross & Co., acting as consultants for the staff of the Federal Communications Commission, made a study of how this corporate structure affects costs for telephone service. According to their report, written in 1974:

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Western Electric's efficient performance has resulted in lower costs than otherwise would have been incurred. Because of Western's pricing policies and practices, these lower costs have not increased profits, but have been passed on to operating companies in the form of lower prices....The effect of the interrelationship between Bell and Western Electric is to operate Western, not as a manufacturing concern, but as an integral part of a vertically integrated communications firm. These interrelationships result in a favorable impact upon Western's costs, prices and service to operating companies.



Western Electric's first commercially successful vacuum tube (left) was used in 1915 in the amplifiers that made possible the first transcontinental telephone call. Solid-state electronics, begun at Bell Labs, makes it possible for tiny integrated circuits (right) to do the work of many vacuum tubes.

Another major factor affecting productivity is investment in new technology—in research and development. Bell Laboratories is recognized worldwide as one of the leading development and research institutions anywhere. The achievements of Bell Labs people have won two Nobel prizes, one for the demonstration of the wave nature of matter, and the other for the invention of the transistor.

The search for new and better technology has always been a part of the telephone industry. On March 10, 1876, Alexander Graham Bell and Thomas A. Watson achieved that famous first telephone message, "Mr. Watson, come here. I want to see you." At once they began to improve the instrument, and make it more usable. The goal, then as now, was to provide good telephone service at a price almost every American could afford.

The effect of research and engineering on costs can be seen most readily by considering how it has changed methods of transmitting calls. Bell Labs scientists found ways to send many conversations simultaneously through a pair of wires, and later through coaxial cables. They incorporated microwave radio into transmission systems for long distance calls.

In just the last quarter century, such improvements have reduced the average cost per circuit mile of the Bell System nationwide long distance network from $60 to $16. (See graph.) The cost of the newest coaxial cable system is less than $2 per circuit mile.

Average cost per circuit mile of interstate transmission facilities.



But Bell engineers are not satisfied. Already they are preparing the technology for even greater economies and capacities when call volumes reach a level to justify using it. The new Comstar domestic satellite—being used jointly by the Bell System and GTE Satellite Corporation—in addition to standard communications traffic will

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beam experimental signals to an extraordinarily precise antenna so that Bell Laboratories scientists can investigate super-high frequencies that could provide increased satellite capacity in the future. And new systems, using millimeter waveguides or laser light and glass fibers, are expected to reduce transmission costs and add new capacity also.

Another simple way to measure how technology improves productivity is to look at the number of Bell System people required to serve each 10,000 telephones. In 1925 it took 246. In 1958 it took 148. Today it takes 65.

Finally, the Bell System seeks to improve productivity by improving the methods used to manage the telephone business. For instance, the teamwork of Western Electric and Bell Labs people was cited earlier. To facilitate their interaction, some Bell Labs people work adjacent to Western Electric plants. A significant reduction has resulted in the time required to get a new design from drawing board to actual production.

The Bell System is placing greater emphasis on computerized information retrieval for the mountain of data connected with serving 118.5 million telephones. It is moving toward a standardized format for recording and storing data, to make more efficient use of computers.

The Bell System is placing greater emphasis on new methods of employee training, on the restructuring of jobs, and on



The Bell Systems's Telstar® satellite demonstrated the feasibility of using space satellites for communications.

efforts to build more responsibility, challenge and satisfaction into jobs at all levels. Experience to date indicates that these changes help people do a better job, reduce employee turnover, and consequently improve productivity as well.

That is exactly the result one would expect, on the basis of the 1927 Hawthorne findings. The Bell System has changed a lot since 1927. But it still emphasizes people, research, manufacturing efficiency and an organizational structure that fosters teamwork.

Data issued by the federal Bureau of Labor Statistics show that overall the productivity of the telephone industry has increased 50% since 1965. That is two-and-a-half times the productivity increase of the United States economy as a whole.

In that same decade, the cost of living rose 75%. Telephone rates for local service went up only 40%. And interstate long distance rates went up about 4%. Now 95% of all American homes have telephones.

One Bell System. It works.

Bell System

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BOOKS & THE ARTS

Humanity a Century Hence

BUSINESS CIVILIZATION IN DECLINE. *By Robert L. Heilbroner. W.W. Norton & Co. 127 pp. $6.95.*

VICTOR LEBOW

We have here the perturbations of a humane and philosophical economist concerned in the beginning with the outlook for this country in the years immediately ahead, then broadening his perspective to embrace all humanity in the shadowy future of two centuries hence. Drifting through this hazardous exercise, like figures in a Chagall canvas, are Karl Marx, foreseeing the doom of capitalism from its internal contradictions, Thorstein Veblen with his vision of the directing role of scientists and technicians, Barry Commoner directing his jeremiads against the polluters of the environment, and the warnings by the Ehrlichs and others of the consequences of the population explosion.

This is another of Professor Heilbroner's ventures in assessing our present and what lies beyond, trying to trace the route which, he believes, capitalism must follow, first in order to survive, and later to succumb to a metamorphosis in which it becomes indistinguishable from the state itself. Readers may recall his *Inquiry into the Human Prospect*, followed by *The Limits of Capitalism*, and an even earlier work in which he tried to discern "where we are in history."

In this present work, Heilbroner engages in an analysis of the special characteristics of capitalism which must lead, he suggests, to the extinction of this business civilization. As an intellectual exercise, it is a pleasure and an adventure to follow his speculations about the prospects facing humanity a century and more hence—dismal though they be. Here a reviewer can summarize and comment, but is hardly in a position to dispute. However, when he says of the immediate future that "Capitalism is drifting into planning," a number of questions obtrude themselves. Incidentally, this is the third book *The Nation* will have reviewed this year in which the necessity of planning is announced with practically no consideration given to its feasibility under capitalism. (The others were Robert Lekachman's *Economists at Bay* and George C. Lodge's *The New American Ideology*, both by economists. Robert L. Heilbroner is Norman Thomas Professor of Economics at the New School for Social Research.)

In his view, the political machinery within this business civilization grows and accumulates more power, taking on functions previously confined to the economic sphere—all with the purpose of preserving the capitalist system. He sees this expansion of political functions as a major factor leading to the extinction of the business civilization. The tensions between the selfish, acquisitive character of capitalism and the demands of the very social order which it has spawned, require not only more regulation of the operations of business but the imposition of planning, converting the machinery of the system and its present domination of the market forces into a device serving the requirements of society as a whole.

Evidently, the very thought of planning gives businessmen nightmares. The January issue of the *Morgan Guaranty Survey*, for example, features a long article by F.A. Hayek, Nobel Laureate in Economics, famous for his *Road to Serfdom*, attacking the recently formed Initiative Committee for National Economic Planning and all its ideas. Says Hayek, "That we have been able to achieve a reasonably high degree of order in our economic lives despite modern complexities is *only* because our affairs have been guided, not by central direction, but by the operations of the market and competition in securing the mutual adjustment of separate efforts." No better statement could be formulated by our hard-bitten Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. Simon. Yet we have to face the total incompatability of planning with the capitalist mode of production, with the overriding concept of private property, and the "sovereign" rights of the owners and managers of corporate enterprise. "Indicative" planning, such as exists in some capitalist nations, is largely a statistical service for business, projecting resources and market opportunities, possible demand and probable supply.

In France, the *Commissariat du Plan* has some power derived from the state's virtual control of financing, and important sections of the economy are already government owned—automobile production and the railroads, for example. But nobody can claim that this is truly national economic planning. Sweden has had more success with its form of planning, in an economy in which the percentage of privately owned enterprises is considerably larger than in the United States. But again, this planning has not shielded Sweden from the effects of the worldwide inflation and recession, nor from unemployment—to say nothing of the social problems arising from the very assurance of cradle-to-grave security.

Furthermore, regardless of the claims made for "socialist" planning, it has not overcome its propensities toward overproduction, its shoddiness in quality, and its far from satisfactory regard for consumer needs and wants. In Soviet and Eastern European procedures, the planning bureaucracy determines what the people want, and while the process is embroidered with pretenses of consultation at lower echelons and with democratic opinion seeking, it bears no real resemblance to what honest market research could accomplish—not, of course, the meretricious handmaiden to consumption that American business has made of it.

It is quite true that it has required increasing government intervention to save business from the consequences of its greed and its heedless wielding of power. But we have seen the regulatory agencies converted into tributaries of big business. Heilbroner insists on another interpretation of the current scene which is open to question. As he puts it, "There seems to be a chronic and deep-seated pressure for rising prices built into the operations of contemporary capitalism—a pressure. . .that resides ultimately in a changed balance of power between capital and labor, tilting the balance in favor of the latter." This is difficult to accept. At the moment there is glee in the administration over what is seen as a strong comeback from the depression of the past several years. But the real improvement is to be seen in the sharply increased profits of business, while the cost of living remains high, and unemployment is still at an insufferable height—hidden by the abysmally unrealistic system of recording and computing our unemployment statistics. But Heilbroner looks for government intervention to expand not only into control of prices and wages but also into dividends and profits.

All this is not to deny the pertinence and force of his critique of capitalism. This is an essentially static social system, he points out, and thus a society which stands in contradiction to the commitment to change which is the lifeblood of capitalism. What makes it static is "the social core of the system, its structure of privilege." This is demonstrated by the disparity in income

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and wealth between those who own substantial amounts of property or hold high posts in the business world, and the rest of the population. Actually, the figures show that over the past decades there has been little change in the distribution of income: the top 10 per cent of family units receive about 30 per cent of all income, much the same as in 1910!

To the radical, government intervention appears always as designed for the preservation of the business system; Heilbroner cannot agree that the political machinery will continue subservient to economic interests. For him the principal function of government is to preserve society, and to do that may require changes that will profoundly alter the social relationships within capitalism, may perhaps force the state to assert complete control for the purpose of preserving the system of political power. With this assertion of a dichotomy between the state and the business system it is difficult for your reviewer to agree.

However, one can accept Heilbroner's view that inflation, recessions, breakdowns, the insolvency of cities and states, the mounting dangers of pollution and of resource exhaustion, all call for continuing government efforts "to adapt the system of private property and market privilege to the new dangers and challenges which might otherwise disrupt it fatally." Were this a country with an alert and politically sophisticated electorate, with a genuine opposition party, perhaps Heilbroner's vision of business becoming the "civil service of a nation-state" might merit credence. Yet, he sees this as an era which historians in the future will describe as the period of "planned capitalism"—a sort of interregnum between business domination of the system and the final ascendancy of the state.

Looking ahead, Heilbroner admits to a disturbing obscurity clouding his vision of the next twenty-five to fifty years, but he tells us that he can discern the more distant future with some clarity. This "middle-run" future will not confirm the earlier predictions made about it. Marx saw capitalism as a social order that is inherently self-destructive. But capitalism was violently altered only in the Soviet Union, while it emerged in good health from its most catastrophic trials in West Germany and Japan. The Marxian prediction has failed for three reasons: First, the present-day industrial working class is not revolutionary. (He might have added, for the United States, that our country is the only one in the industrialized world without a political movement and party to press the claims of the working masses and the poor.) Second, as the business system has grown, both in economic power and in its technological advances, both white-collar workers and industrial workers have absorbed the bourgeois outlook and values. Finally, there is the widespread disillusionment with socialism as practiced in the Soviet Union and its satellites (where it should be called noncapitalist rather than socialist by the Marxian definition).

If one set of predictions has failed thus far, so have the expectations of the ameliorative qualities of capitalism. We see decay, violence, profound social discontents, not only in the United States but throughout the industrialized world. There can be no denying the weakness in this business civilization. It cannot bless us with social harmony. It has alienated its youth, who now no longer accept the values and traditions on which it has reposed. From these phenomena, Heilbroner poses the possibility that "we stand at the threshold of an era in which deep-seated changes in lifeways will undermine capitalism in a manner as fatal as the most dramatic proletarian revolution."

The era of capitalism has been one in which the economic drive has shaped the political and social life of its time. Of course, from its earliest beginnings, the state has always taken a hand in helping the economic system stay healthy and productive. Now Heilbroner sees the rise of a political "superstructure" not only to equality with the economic powers but actually moving toward taking command of them.

While he does not expect the relative affluence attained under capitalism to be much lessened during the coming decades, his thesis is that this very affluence, supported by the rights won in terms of incomes and security, will help undermine the foundation on which the market operations of capitalism depend. The rub comes, however, from two directions: the steady pressure of inflation, and the unrelenting rise of wages ahead of productivity, especially in the area of services, including those of governments. He sees labor growing in power, buttressed by unemployment insurance, welfare, etc., which are altering the relationship of labor to capital. The question of who will do the dirty, menial work of society becomes more pressing.

What is happening is the parallel growth in size and complexity of both the corporate giants and the bureaucracy of the state. And with the rise of the "technostructure"—the scientists and technicians—Heilbroner foresees a contest for power emerging not between capital and labor but between capital and this technical elite—a vision which Veblen entertained in his *The Engineers and the Price System*. In this "middle range" of the future, Heilbroner sees society facing the serious challenge of asserting full control over those technologies which can create chaos in the social order. No capitalist nation—nor any socialist nation, for that matter—has yet had the courage to call a halt to any advances in technology; all advanced societies have been kept from doing so by the fear of giving an economic and military advantage to potential enemies. In both socialist and capitalist societies there are similar problems: the question of what limits to put on science and technology, and that of the previously unquestioned premise of limitless growth.

In his speculations, Heilbroner sees socialist societies as better able to face the necessary changes because they do not have to struggle against "the mystique of private ownership." But perhaps the parliamentary systems and the long traditions of democracy may help the capitalist nations. His hope is that we will be able to "weld the best of socialist economic practice with the best of liberal capitalist political practice." Whether this is attainable he does not try to predict. To a reviewer harassed and dispirited by the fulminations of Reagan and Ford, Carter and Jackson, and the rest of the pack, and the televidiocy of this vaunted democracy now in its senescent Bicentennial, these theories and hopes seem unreal and utopian—but credit Professor Heilbroner with high and compassionate ideals.

Using Daniel Bell's label of "post-industrial capitalism," he moves to the next phase of development. The labor force in agriculture, now about 4 per cent of the total, will not grow. The industrial workers now make up about one-third of the total, and, for the first time, the service industries have expanded to take over nearly two-thirds of the remainder. Since under "service" are included all the skills requiring training and education, this post-industrial society will look for its growth from qualitative rather than quantitative factors. As improved technology takes over and lightens much of the work, there should be a decline in heavier kinds of labor. Of course the dogma of continued growth raises questions regarding the possible reduction in industrial production. How to measure growth poses another problem, for the GNP is of little value because so many factors enter into that statistical concoction. Do we have more growth by producing more armaments, going on more space expeditions, turning out more gadgets, and introducing more style changes?

Certain new aspects of the times ahead result from the primacy of the "knowledge industries." A corollary of more education has been more specialization, with a consequent loss in the ability to perform tasks not related to one's specialty—something which could not be said of the pre-industrial artisan. Heilbroner debunks the

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enormous figures attributed to research and development, on which an estimated $20 billion were spent in 1966, but actually only $1 billion went into basic research; and the touted invention factories of the giant corporations do not actually invent as many new processes, products and genuine contributions to the well-being of the society as do individual inventors and small firms.

However, the concentration of business will continue in this post-industrial society, and with it will be the welfare state with its various benefits and assurances of security. Inequality of income and wealth will persist. But what will transform this into a transitional stage, into a post-capitalist society, will be the increased vulnerability of the economy to the threat of strikes and stoppages due to the growth of the service sector. This disruptive power of labor will, in his opinion, undermine the efficacy of the market mechanism and further encourage the institution of a planned economy. The so-called post-industrial society "thus becomes that period of economic history in which men make their boldest attempt to escape from the thralldom of social forces over which they have hitherto exercised no control." (Heilbroner always offers the caveat that all bets are off if the world is engulfed in a nuclear holocaust.) How wisely we will use this new freedom remains in doubt, and he does not dismiss the idea that disaster may be our lot.

Taking his thesis beyond our national boundaries, Heilbroner enters into an examination of the multinational corporations, since they exemplify many of the tensions dominating the capitalist world today. The idea that they not only transcend the nation-state but in time will displace it, he cannot accept. But he does emphasize their challenge to national sovereignty by means of their ability to shift productive enterprises from one country to another, to move bank balances to safer or more remunerative banking centers, and to avoid or reduce their tax liabilities. Yet, essentially, they are and remain American, or Japanese, or British, or German—they have not, and may never achieve that supernational status which the authors of *Global Reach* foresee.

They do demonstrate the insatiable drive for growth, for expansion, and for competitive advantage. For, as he says, "the struggle for market shares has always been a central aspect of the capitalist system. . . no less intense. . . in the age of the modern 'socially responsible' firm." Then Heilbroner goes on to make a point which is of highly questionable pertinence. This world economy dominated by these giant corporations, he says, finds it beyond its capacity to hold prices at stable levels, provide anything like full employment, and produce all the goods, and particularly all the services needed by the population. Aside from the public relations scripts of Exxon, one may question whether this is an accurate description of the aims of business.

However one views the multinational corporations in the industrialized world, there is little question that in the underdeveloped countries they frequently play a malignant role. They encourage, enrich and support the elites of those countries, and promote concentration on agricultural production for export instead of helping them develop their own food and other resources. Multinational profits in those countries are often extremely high, but this was true in the days of the plantation system and other forms of exploitation from the days of the Dutch and British East India companies, or later, of the United Fruit Company in the "banana republics."

Heilbroner views the multinationals as bringing still more pressure toward planning and control of all business enterprise. Today there is an active demand for decentralization or the actual dismantling of these giants, as in the recent bills introduced by Senator Hart, chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly. Heilbroner expresses his own desire to see their massive power dissolved, power "that is so much a force for human deformation in our times." But between the greed and power hunger of the corporations and the ineptitude and hypocrisy of the rule of the nation-state—with its dependence on that "last refuge of scoundrels," patriotism —one is at a loss to know where mankind is to turn for its deliverance. Only primitive peoples have been able to live their lives without the organizational and bureaucratic impedimenta that characterize more advanced civilizations, building their lives "around the great supportive pillars of tradition or religious life." Since we have not such elements that may serve to solve our problems in this "middle future," we will have to utilize "both the crude agencies of nationalism with its irrationality and force, and corporations or ministries with their hierarchies of status and inculcated dissatisfaction."

Now, what of the "long run?" Only static civilizations live for ages, until a more advanced civilization obtrudes. But capitalism, with its ethos enshrined in the constant search for change, surely cannot live on indefinitely. Heilbroner predicts that "within a century" capitalism will have ceased to exist in any form recognizable in our experience (barring, of course, the extinction of the industrialized world by nuclear war). He gives two major reasons for thus limiting the life span of capitalism and such immediate successor forms as may be set up in the hope of perpetuating it. First, we are now well past that epoch during which the expansion of capitalism was encouraged by its opportunities, seemingly endless, in a world of riches and vast areas for exploitation. Now nature is demanding that we apply the brakes. The exponential growth of the system meant a constantly increasing appetite for the resources of the planet and an equally steady, growing, and appalling deposit of mountainous wastes. Such processes cannot go on forever.

The optimistic predictions regarding energy and other resources are ridiculous overestimates. Heilbroner cites the case of coal which, at our current rate of use could last for over 5,000 years, but if the rate of extraction and consumption were to expand by just over 4 per cent a year, would all be consumed within 135 years. Similarly, aluminum will be exhausted in 140 years, and the ten leading minerals may last out 200 years. Perhaps new technologies and intensive recycling might postpone the fateful hour. But we must also understand that the underdeveloped nations of today will be driving to industrialize and will consume both energy and natural resources possibly at a rate to balance any reduction in the consumption of the industrialized world.

More basic for the limited life span of capitalism is the problem of pollution, for that is a direct threat to continued life on this planet. How long can industrial and other wastes continue to poison the environment? Climatologists foresee changes in temperatures that could result in climatic modifications "that will be both global and irreversible," to quote the National Center for Atmospheric Research. Thus, taking into account both the rate of consumption of resources and the mounting effects of pollution, growth must come to a halt within 100 years. Heilbroner applies this projection to both the industrial capitalist and socialist worlds, but the effects will be felt by the less developed countries as well. The tension between rich and poor nations will be exacerbated. One can hardly visualize a great burst of generosity and a redistribution of wealth. Nor is it reasonable to expect the emergence of some global government capable of folding all peoples under its wings. Thus, he expects the antagonism between the developed and the underdeveloped nations to increase. Furthermore, there is the already clear possibility that nuclear weapons will be ready to hand in all but the most impoverished nations. But the end of capitalism does not depend on its going up in a mushroom cloud.

It must pass out of history for many reasons. With the limits imposed on its growth will come an "exhaustion of spirit" and changes in the values, ambitions, and morale of the business system. Fixed and limited output must mean a steady erosion of profits, and between the intensified

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competition and the demands of workers, it must continue to decline. The struggle between labor and capital will grow more fierce. With limited profits, the demands of the poor can only be met out of the pockets of the rich. At this point the question of the legitimacy of property rights will confront the society. Heilbroner sees another cause for the breakup of the business system in the very operations of the planning bureaucracy, in which the power of the scientists and technicians increases. The public authority makes the decisions as to what products and services are to be made available to the citizenry. Whether this political power will find some pleasant means of doing the job, or whether it will require the imposition of military discipline and the use of force, he cannot foretell.

Capitalism is already showing signs that it can no longer generate the social morale so essential to continued existence. It is true that it has freed probably more than half of the American people from scarcity and want. But at the heart of this business civilization is a "hollowness"—everything is evaluated in money terms. "Or consider advertising, perhaps the most value-destroying activity of a business civilization." That hollowness is further emphasized by the low estimation business places on the value of work, which it sees as a means to an end—not the true end in itself, for that is profit, income, economic growth. Nor is industrial socialism immune to this outlook, for its roots lie "in machine process and worship of efficiency." Under a business civilization, as Heilbroner puts it sharply, "the values of output are celebrated and those of input merely calculated."

He does not discuss the questions that have been raised regarding the character of life and organization in a "no-growth" society. Capitalism, he believes, will not be destroyed by revolution but will gradually change its character until it is superseded by the planned state. As to whether the resulting society will be some version of fascism, or of socialist hue, he cannot say, but he feels that neither form will probably apply to these new societies adapting to wholly new and unprecedented changes. He suspects that some new religion, with an original theology regarding the meaning of life, as well as some new form of social organization, will have to arise to replace the deification of materialism which is the powerful cult of this business civilization. The individual will have to subordinate himself to the interests of society. Heilbroner would like to think that political and intellectual liberties will survive, but the centralization and pervasive control of political authority besets him with doubts. If anything, his vision would appear to portend a future for which the present People's Republic of China might be the paradigm.

But Heilbroner argues it would be wrong to see only the ugly aspects, the philistinism of our society. True, "no other civilization has permitted the calculus of selfishness to dominate its lifeways, nor has any other civilization allowed this narrowest of all motivations to be elevated to the status of a near categorical imperative." But bourgeois culture did bring with it ideas of equality and the right to dissent, the joys of intellectual adventure and the right to a degree of nonconformity. The civilization of capitalism will also have its glories to celebrate in its parliaments, its science, its arts, to be admired as we admire the achievements of civilizations long gone.

Heilbroner concludes with a salute to the philosophy of individualism which, while a crass expression of capitalism, was also an assertion of the uniqueness, the final autonomy of each individual. Perhaps that philosophy will survive. "I only know that when I take the measure of capitalism, it is for me the element that, if it does not redeem the whole, at least offers the deepest reason to hope that not all of its civilization will disappear along with the business system."

With this book, Professor Heilbroner joins that still small contingent who not only foresee the end of capitalism, but are bending their thoughts to the practical and human problems the ensuing civilization will have to meet and master. □

Radical Goals, Conservative Speech

LINCOLN AND THE WAR DEMOCRATS: The Grand Erosion of Conservative Tradition. *By Christopher Dell. Fairleigh Dickinson University Press. 455 pp. $18.50.*

ALAN M. KRAUT

No crisis in the past two centuries, including Watergate, tested the mettle of American political institutions as severely as did the Civil War. The four-year ordeal and its aftermath created an atmosphere of bitterness and distrust, but even the trauma of Secession and war failed to interrupt the political process. Congressional, state and local elections, and even a Presidential election, were held in those states remaining in the Union during the war years.

Partisan competition also proceeded without intermission, if not without confusion, between 1861 and 1865. The war muddled party labels and scrambled political loyalties in the North sufficiently to keep generations of historians busy mapping the labyrinth of the politics of the period. Much of this research has focused on President Abraham Lincoln, who adroitly reconciled conflicting factions within Northern society, and especially within the Republican Party, so that the war could be vigorously pursued to a military victory for the Union.

Far less attention, however, has been paid to the tribulations of Lincoln's Democratic opponents, especially those who supported the Republican President's leadership of the war effort. Often called "War Democrats" by contemporaries, such individuals were looked upon with suspicion by Republicans and were loathed by their former colleagues within the Democratic Party who challenged Lincoln and his policies.

The War Democracy is the subject of Christopher Dell's provocative new book. The author, an analyst in history and public affairs for the Congressional Research Service, has written a broad survey of his subject. He deals not only with such prominent figures as Lincoln's second-term Vice President Andrew Johnson, Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton, and Generals Benjamin Butler, George McClellan and Lew Wallace but also with the many War Democrats who participated in state and local politics during the war.

Dell directly attributes the active role that many of these Democrats played in saving the Union to the political sagacity of Abraham Lincoln. He finds the President to have been the "Pied Piper of Civil War politics who lured unwary Democrats with Conservative phraseology and Radical intent." Throughout the volume Dell traces the radicalizing of the War Democracy and Lincoln's contribution to the process of conversion.

The origins of the War Democracy were shaped even before Sumter, according to Dell. He cites a number of "proto-War Democrats" who, even before the outbreak of war, had refused to accept peace at the price of Union. Though Dell does not include Stephen A. Douglas in this category, the Little Giant's pro-Union sympathies later became a model for many of his fellow Democrats. After the war began, Douglas set the tone for War Democrats with his pronouncement that "There can be

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no neutrals in this war, *only patriots—or traitors!*" Many Democrats answered this call for bipartisan support of Lincoln's efforts to force the South back into the Union.

The spirit of bipartisanship did not attract all Democrats, however; nor did all those Democrats who supported Lincoln in 1861 continue to do so. By 1862 some Democrats began to reassert their partisan opposition to Lincoln and the Republicans. While previous scholars such as Eric McKitrick believe that self-preservation demanded Democratic opposition to Lincoln, Dell believes that those Democrats who opposed Lincoln were ideologically motivated. They were the guardians of a "conservative tradition" that they refused to relinquish even at the cost of the Union.

The foundation of this conservatism was racism and its cornerstone was slavery. Thus, "Conservative" or "Peace" Democrats, Dell maintains, could support the war only insofar as it did not interfere with or destroy the South's peculiar institution. If slavery could not be saved, then the Union would be better off dissolved.

While the Conservative Democrats battled Lincoln, the President was also harassed, Dell suggests, by the radical wing of his own party. These radicals demanded the end of slavery and the use of military coercion to compel the South to rejoin the Union without slavery. Conservatives insisted that Lincoln define his war powers narrowly, particularly those powers pertaining to the curtailment of civil liberties, but radicals urged the President to abridge whatever rights and privileges were necessary to silence Democratic critics of the war. War Democrats joined the radicals in supporting Lincoln's expansion of his wartime powers, even though it often meant suppression of other Democrats.

When Lincoln ordered the military arrest of civilians suspected of being disloyal and the denial of their rights of *habeas corpus,* the War Democrat John W. Forney, editor of the *Philadelphia Press,* declared that the times required "universal confidence" in the Lincoln administration. Though Forney admitted that most of the civilians arrested were Democrats, he believed it folly to assume that partisanship rather than wartime necessity was the reason for the arrests. War Democrats generally shared Forney's trust in Lincoln's integrity.

As Lincoln pursued the war, the War Democrats sought a stronger voice in the administration and in the Congress. According to Dell they vigorously opposed the Peace Democrats throughout the North. War Democrats dominated most state Democratic organizations from April 1861 until the Confederate victory at Second Bull Run in September 1862. The peace faction appeared to revive in 1862, though their victories were far less impressive than they claimed. The real winners that year were the "Conditionals," those Democrats who took their cue from Horatio Seymour of New York and pledged their support to the Union on the condition that victory not be accompanied by emancipation. Conditionals feared inundation of the North by free blacks after the war. Dell estimates almost one-third of the Democrats in Congress and elsewhere in the loyal states were Conditionals.

Dell believes that the Peace Democrats were mistakenly encouraged by Conditional victories at the polls in 1862 and the Union defeat at Fredericksburg shortly after the election. Based on an erroneous assessment of their own electoral strength, Peace Democrats launched an all-out propaganda assault on Lincoln and the Union cause the following year. The attack boomeranged because, as Dell suggests, many War Democrats took it as a signal to bolt their party for the Republican Party, or the Union Party, a coalition of Republicans and War Democrats in the Border States. For some Democrats the shift was temporary, and they returned to their party after the Peace Democrats were repudiated in the election of 1863. But many Democrats abandoned their party and the "conservative tradition" for the remainder of the war, some for the rest of their lives.

Dell's book is far better at narrating what the War Democrats did than in identifying them or explaining their behavior. A collective biography or more detailed case studies would have breathed life into those individuals who became War Democrats, and perhaps explained why some Democrats and not others deserted the "conservative tradition" to support Lincoln. Was it a matter of individual opportunism, constituency pressure, patriotism, or did War Democrats see loyalty to the Union as a better means of helping the Democracy to survive the war than actively resisting Lincoln, the war, and emancipation?

One of the main theses of Dell's book is that Lincoln was a man of radical goals, but conservative speech. He credits Lincoln with proselytizing the War Democrats, though he fails to explain why Lincoln was more successful with some Democrats than with others. Dell calls Lincoln the "butcher of conservative tradition," but offers no persuasive demonstration of so strong an assertion. It is questionable whether Lincoln was all that radical, nor does Dell prove that Lincoln's anti-slavery position ever evolved beyond what was necessary to preserve his political coalition. Dell contradicts himself. He admits that while the President was hardly a conservative on the slavery issue, neither was he "an outspoken radical." Rather Lincoln was "unique," and "above all else, a very clever politician"—an appraisal that differs little from Kenneth Stampp's view of Lincoln as first and foremost a "practical Whig."

Dell's portrait of the Democrats is as flawed as his profile of Lincoln. He exaggerates the conflict among Democrats in Congress, permitting the vituperative exchanges between Peace and War Democrats to distract attention from their cohesive voting record on the war and other issues. Historians such as Leonard P. Curry and Allan G. Bogue have used quantitative analysis to study voting behavior, rather than focus on the rhetoric in the 37th Congress, 1861-63. They have found remarkable agreement among Democrats not only on war-related issues and slavery but also on a wide variety of other legislation including the Homestead Act, the Land Grant College Act and the Pacific Railway Act. Dell does not cite these studies in his work, nor does he undertake similar systematic analysis of voting patterns in the Congress or Northern state legislatures.

Dell's oversimplification is a product of his own mistaken assumptions about America's history until 1865. First, he assumes that the entire period from 1776 to 1865 was a time when race was the primary issue in American society, taking precedence over all other economic, constitutional and sectional issues. Second, he assumes that the Democratic Party was the sole champion of racism, or the "conservative tradition," in America. Finally, Dell credits Lincoln and Republican radicals with undertaking the "grand erosion" of that tradition.

These are bold assumptions, but neither Dell's research nor the work of others bears them out. In fact, most recent studies suggest that while racism has always been an undercurrent in American life, it rarely came to the surface as a political issue in ante-bellum society, precisely because of the consensus which sustained it in the hearts and minds of most Americans. Neither Democrats nor Republicans held a monopoly on racism or the hatred it engendered.

Slavery was an issue eschewed by most ante-bellum politicians because it was a moral issue, not easily compromisable, and potentially disruptive of national political coalitions. When slavery finally did arise as a political issue during the 1840s, it had to be introduced into partisan politics by the Liber-

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ty Party, an abolitionist third party, because neither Democrats nor Whigs wished to infuse politics with moral questions.

Dell's belief that Republican radicals were blameless in the revival of racism after the war is also mistaken. In a much too cursory analysis of Reconstruction in the book's final chapter, Dell accuses the federal courts of failing to secure the freedman his rights before the law. However, C. Vann Woodward and others have persuasively argued that radical Republican reticence in the face of their anti-black Northern constituents doomed the black man's hopes for justice even before the courts affirmed the racist social policies of 19th-century America. The battle for equality before the law was lost at the ballot box, not at the bench, in the years after the war.

Erroneous assumptions and one-sided analysis flaw Dell's perception of wartime politics. He has succeeded in recalling the War Democracy from obscurity, and that is the book's contribution. Future scholars will have to provide a more balanced and thorough analysis of American politics during the critical period between Secession and Reconstruction. □

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FILMS / Robert Hatch

I am firm in my mind that a man who will come into a café for a breakfast cup of coffee and accept instead the cup of chocolate that is set before him is alarmingly unsure of who he is. So I expected from the start that Trelkovsky, the hero of Roman Polanski's *The Tenant*, was about to experience that familiar contemporary disturbance, a crisis of identity. And when, in the same early scene, the café proprietor presses on Trelkovsky a pack of Marlboros instead of the Gauloises he had requested, I was confident I knew what form the crisis would take—the previous tenant in Trelkovsky's new flat had smoked Marlboros. After that it was largely a matter of waiting for the obvious to be accomplished.

Trelkovsky (played by Polanski) is a French naturalized Pole, working at a small job in, I believe, a Paris architectural office. He must need a new apartment very badly, for he rents this one despite the fact that he is insulted and bullied by the concierge (Shelley Winters) and the landlord (Melvyn Douglas). Learning that the young woman who preceded him is in a hospital, horribly injured by her leap from the window, he visits her, taking a bag of fruit. The dying patient screams most shockingly when another visitor tries to rouse her. Trelkovsky and this other woman retreat in anguish; he offers her a drink and they go then to a movie, where she seduces him in a groping sort of way. All very unnerving to a man with a dislocated personality.

Back at the flat, he finds the dead woman's clothes, her cosmetics, even a tooth she had lost and hidden in the wall. The concierge had recommended, with a guffaw, that he watch the window of the lavatory across the hall; he does so, and discovers that a succession of persons are staring fixedly at him. Doggedly, he organizes a housewarming, inviting to the party office associates who reminded me of the crowd Hieronymus Bosch assembled to mock Christ. The noise is outrageous and the other tenants are outraged. Trelkovsky becomes increasingly distrait.

And I became increasingly estranged, peering at my watch, fiddling with the change in my pocket. *The Tenant* is about the loneliness, the humiliations, the desperate social stratagems of the outsider; that is a valid theme, and the French are as adept as any people at making a foreigner aware of his deficiencies. Pathetically and foolishly, Trelkovsky keeps protesting that he is a French citizen; that is precisely what most irritates the French about him. Polanski is fine in this aspect of the character, showing us a neat man, alert, courteous, shyly dignified. Dustin Hoffman would hardly do it as well.

But I cannot relate to subjective films about madness, and from the start (that cup of chocolate) Trelkovsky is around the bend. He is clearly going to get rapidly worse, and from the moment he discovers the dresses and the nail polish I knew what form his psychosis would take. So—are the other tenants the ogres and harpies who appear at Trelkovsky's door; are people really spying on him from across the way; was there a plot to kill the previous tenant (i.e., is everyone in the building crazy?) and are they out to get Trelkovsky in turn? Since there is no way to find out by observing Trelkovsky and since everyone else is seen through his eyes, these are not very useful questions. Nor is it more than sentimental to imply that Trelkovsky went mad because people rolled their eyes at his accent. No doubt they did; Paris is rough on foreign accents, but it is also full of foreigners who get along there well enough. Trelkovsky died of xenophobia? You could as well say he died of a broken heart. What it comes down to is that we meet him too late in the day to know, or care, much about him. He is a police statistic—"Naturalized Pole Jumps from Window"—and the real story, which probably took place somewhere else at some other time, was over before we got to the theatre. I can imagine why Polanski may have felt drawn to the character, but I am surprised that his narrative instinct didn't warn him that Trelkovsky was a clinical datum (and at that an enigmatic one) instead of a protagonist.

It is only a detail, but the babel of incongruous accents in this picture, some native to the speakers, some atrociously dubbed, might with justice make a Frenchman savage. Only Polanski, whose accent is indeed Polish, sounds as though he could conceivably be speaking from Paris. In this respect, the trouble with films is that they are too convincing. The theatre is an illusion, and "translation" is acceptable. But when you step off an actual Paris street into a real café, only to be addressed by the barman in sloppy American, you want to know how come. It suggests another whole story.

The gulf between funny and foolish is not so wide that Neil Simon could not leap it in his screenplay for *Murder By Death*. The picture starts as the one and soon collapses into the other.

The idea is promising: a brilliant amateur of crime, one Lionel Twain (Tru-

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man Capote), invites five of the most celebrated detectives of fiction to dinner and a killing. His understandable motive is to show these hitherto infallible sleuths, and hence their creators, that they are not half as smart as Twain who, as his name suggests, does everything by twos. The five, transparently misnamed, are Milo Perrier (James Coco), Sam Diamond (Peter Falk), Jessica Marbles (Elsa Lanchester), Dick Charleston (David Niven) and Sidney Wang (Peter Sellers). To round out the box-office cast, Maggie Smith plays Dora Charleston, Alec Guinness is a blind butler and Estelle Winwood is senile in a wheelchair.

The cast is not only stellar but talented and the impersonations, particularly those of Falk, Niven and Sellers, are entertaining. Capote is a celebrity, not a star, so he impersonates himself, a tiresome exploit, and that is one fault of the picture. A more serious one is that Simon is a gag writer, not a mystery plotter. As a result, once the guests have been gathered, under variously slapstick circumstances, into the dark house, the picture begins to stutter, and the players, given nothing cogent to do, begin to impersonate like crazy. Falk can sound a good deal like Bogart (though Spade never talked that rough; times change), Niven is naturally a ringer for William Powell and Peter Sellers has reached that point in his career where he can scarcely be prevented from impersonating Orientals. These, however, are specialties that do not grow more endearing in the absence of substance, and the substance runs from comic exaggeration to improbability to hysteria in a breakneck descent to chaos. Parody implies wit; gags are not enough. And anyone setting out to demonstrate that Dashiell Hammett, say, or Agatha Christie enjoys an inflated reputation had better show that he can play in the same park with them. Which Simon can't. Robert Moore, a successful theatre director, is here making his first film. I doubt that he was responsible for the depression induced by this essay in mechanical hilarity. □

INDIGENOUS MUSIC / Nat Hentoff

Like many eavesdroppers, I am fascinated by shop talk—lawyers chortling about how they play upon the foibles of judges or Sy Hersh telling how he so boxes in a source that the leads start pouring out. And so it is in jazz—at rehearsals, between sets, after hours, the shop talk can be remarkably illuminating, more so than critical treatises by the most diligent outsiders. But unless you hang out with musicians, there's no way to audit these jazz seminars—except for one utterly unprecedented recording: *Billie Holiday/Songs & Conversations* (Paramount Records / Famous Music Corp.). Released a couple of years ago, it has been largely and inexplicably ignored, but no jazz library should be without it.

The set was taped at a rehearsal toward the end of Lady Day's life, although she doesn't sound at all ready for the last chorus. Billie sounds as I remember her at a mutual friend's home one evening years before—pungently funny about the dreadful squares who run the music business and ceaselessly curious about better ways to make a song *move*. The supporting cast at the rehearsal consisted of bassist Artie Shapiro and pianist Jimmy Rowles, the Gerald Moore of jazz accompanists.

Rowles was trying mightily to reach a consensus with Billie about key signatures (she expected him to fill in whatever he liked so long as it fit); and he was also working with her on some songs that were new to her repertory. From time to time, you do hear her singing. Her approach to *Please Don't Talk About Me When I'm Gone*, for instance, is the very definition of swinging jazz time. And elsewhere (as in *I'm Restless*), the process by which she starts to learn and then comes to entirely possess a tune new to her is a fundamental lesson in the rare art of instrumentalized jazz lieder. (That is, Billie sang like a most supple horn.) For other songs, by talk and then by example, Billie focuses specifically on problems of phrasing, rhythm placement and texture. "I do not got a legitimate voice," she says, laughing, at one point. And not having a "legitimate" voice, she extracted from it—even toward the end when the voice was cracked and gravelly—such subtly variegated, emotionally exact colors that she could transform the most banal lyrics into swiftly piercing epiphanies.

For much of this rehearsal time, however, Billie felt like reminiscing. About the year, for instance, when "They ran me out of Chicago. The owner of the Grand Terrace," she mimics that worthy's heavy, indignant incomprehension, "tells me I got to get out because I sound like I'm tired, like I'm sleeping. Man, it took me ten years for people to pick up on what I was doing." And another time, confronted by the explosive Joe Glaser, her booker and manager and a man well connected in the nether world, Billie refuses his command to sing commercially. "Look, you son-of-a-bitch," she laughs again at the mellow memory of standing up to Glaser, "you want it sung that way, *you* sing it! I'm gonna sing *my* way."

It is a singular document, this album, telling much about Lady Day and about jazz itself, psychologically as well as musically. Of course, it won't mean much to those millions of people who know Billie only through the grotesquely ignorant film version of her "life," *Lady Sings the Blues*, with Diana Ross who is to Billie Holiday as Rod McKuen is to W.H. Auden. They finally did commercialize Billie, posthumously. Still, this recording of her true grit remains, as do a number of entirely musical reissues, the best of which to begin with is *Billie Holiday/Golden Years* (Columbia C3L 21).

As is quite timelessly evident on these recordings, including the passages of singing on the rehearsal date, Billie Holiday was the most deeply and durably evocative of all jazz singers—from floating, mocking, good-time highs to unsparing poignancy. Or, for that matter, tragedy, jazz indeed being "serious" music.

In 1957, less than two years before she died, Robert Herridge, Whitney Balliett and I put together *The Sound of Jazz* for CBS-TV, and the section of that hour which has been replayed most often has Billie, sitting on a high stool, singing *Fine and Mellow* to her once and former very good friend, Lester Young.

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They had not spoken for a long time, but that afternoon they connected in and through the blues, looking directly into each other's eyes, their music softly overwhelming everything else around and beneath them. And in the control room, the engineers, the director, the producer, all of us had tears in our eyes. None of us was the least embarrassed either. We were grateful. □

ART

LAWRENCE ALLOWAY

In the issue of May 29 I drew attention to the *57th Street Review*, a pamphlet published by a midtown dealer to cover midtown galleries, and complained at the inert reviewing it accepted. Its downtown equivalent, *Artists Review Art*, is an 8-page, free booklet, published by the Association of Artist Run Galleries. It includes uptown shows but the emphasis is on downtown, and with justice, because many of the galleries in Soho do not receive a fair share of critical attention. However *57th Street Review* and *Artists Review Art* are very similar: both perpetuate the fragmented and evocative mode of art criticism that *Art News* made notorious in the 1950s.

That was not the intention of the editors of *Artists Review Art* who write that, "since there is no vehicle at present in which artists can communicate written or visual ideas freely, we set up this publication." But having said that, the artists write like any other reviewers! Sometimes they are on target, as when Jonathan Price refers to Marcia Clark's "tiny, hand-wide, elbow-long landscapes" (First Street Gallery), which catches nicely the small scale of her high eye-level, deep-space mountain pictures. More often the writing is like this (Miriam Brumer on Philip Orenstein): "For all the corrosion and disintegration alluded to here, the works are quite energetic, even maintaining a kind of sprightly rhythm to their composition. This contradiction keeps the viewer intrigued."

I think that the trouble with both publications can be traced to an erroneous concept of reviewing, whereby somebody goes to a gallery, jots down his or her responses and types up the notes, adding some evocative imagery. Then it is distributed to readers, few of whom have seen the show. It is a form of writing stretched between book-jacket blurbs, prose poems and keeping a journal. Neither the physical character of the work of art nor the aesthetics to which it may belong has much chance of emerging from such an undemanding style. The high incidence of such writing in the art journals, combined with narrow editorial policies, has forced individuals to start their own publications. But old habits die hard and untested writers have resorted to the exhausted model.

Discontent with art writing is expressed in another form of publication, the newsletter, which is far more promising. I am not referring to publications like Francis V. O'Connor's *Federal Art Patronage Notes* (250 East 73rd Street, New York City 10021; subscription $10) which is the bulletin of a precise field of academic study. I am thinking of the publications of (*1*) women's galleries and (*2*) commercial galleries. Among the first there are the *WIA Newsletter* (published by Women In the Arts, 435 Broome Street, New York City 10013; subscription $5), the *Women Artists Newsletter* (Box 3304, Grand Central Station, New York City 10017; subscription $5) and *Central Hall Artists Newsletter* (52 Main Street, Port Washington, N.Y. 11050; subscription $1).

The *WIA Newsletter* presents information about shows, artists in residence, panels and current causes. The *Women Artists Newsletter* is less narrowly documentary and has made a point of reporting some of the numerous panel discussions held in Soho recently. Articles have included May Natalie Tabak's review of "The Depression Decade—Seven American Women at Vassar" and Lucy Lippard's report on a group called Artists Meeting for Cultural Change and their picketing of the Whitney Museum to protest an exhibition of John D. Rockefeller's collection under the title, "Three Centuries of American Art." A recent *Central Hall Artists Newsletter* included "The Artists' Gallery Guide," a survey of downtown galleries on the basis of their hospitality to unknown and women artists. These publications constitute an essential part of the mesh of information that binds women artists together.

The other source of newsletter is the commercial gallery system: the John Weber Gallery (420 West Broadway, New York City 10012) and Allan Frumkin's (50 West 57th Street, New York City 10019). In one way their function is different from that of those produced by the women's movement: the Weber and Frumkin newsletters have a selling function, whereas the others are attempts to achieve social cohesion. However Weber's and Frumkin's publications are welcome, precisely for their avoidance of conventional art criticism. The subject matter of course is restricted to the gallery artists, but since these include, at Weber, Carl André and Robert Smithson, why complain? In Weber's first number there was an account of Smithson's "Partially-Buried Woodshed," an earthwork of 1960 on the grounds of Kent State University which was threatened with demolition. In the second there is a useful list of Sol LeWitt's personally designed books and a discussion of the André exhibition of last January, with fresh information obviously drawn from the artist concerning materials and intentions. The writer is Jeffrey Deitch whose detailed knowledge of the gallery is more interesting than the vague forms of art criticism.

Frumkin's *Newsletter*, one number so far with the next scheduled for the fall, gives detailed and new information concerning the gallery artists. It is written by Jean Martin who has presented a lot of relevant, precise information, some of it prospective. One learns, for instance, that Jack Beal is working on a big mural commission for the Department of Labor Building, "the first commission for a Washington D.C. building that the government has given out in thirty years." Several of the realists in the gallery are in "America 1976," the exhibition sponsored by the Department of the Interior (*The Nation*, June 12). It turns out that Willard Midgette, inclined to an Indian subject, was given a bad time by Indians, who restricted the subjects to which he might have access. Hence, perhaps, the sense of strain between ritual and realist elements in the finished picture.

The point is that art criticism benefits from hard information, often a mixture of art history and news reporting. Data generate knowledge and insight and the lack of data leaves readers too dependent on the critic's literary gifts. The present flurry of newsletters (and more are contemplated) will either develop separately from art criticism or provide critics with the kind of information that they need for more penetrating writing. I hope for the latter. □

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

ACROSS

1 One of the things the devil has leads a water-carrier in the dance. (8)
5 Went through the water with something in addition, since it's wet here. (6)
9 Bar for the reputedly daring. (7)
10 and 25 Scale with ropes, perhaps—and they'll tell you what you're really worth. (7,6)
11 Nothing goes ten to one on the Ides of March, for example, to have a certain elemental effect. (7)
12 This secures the blade. (7)
13 Bunting types possibly associated with the Red Chinese sickle? (13)
15 Supposedly fit place for an emperor's wife. (5,8)
21 Going good? Quite the opposite. (7)
22 The length and duration of the area around your house? (7)
23 What should be very close are found in the smallest home. (7)
24 Speaking of this, at the heart of the hunter? (7)
25 See 10 across
26 The shape of the military establishment. (8)

DOWN

1 Food to show off on board, perhaps. (3,3)
2 In a handy manner, prepared around 49. (7)
3 Win a ministerial title, when it's in the bucket. (7)
4 Musical octets? (Silver bird repertoire.) (6,2,5)
6 Coming up to impair the stream of ore, with a couple of animals as usual. (7)
7 An opening for sewers, perhaps. (7)
8 Ships' timbers capsized with a broken set being most smooth. (8)
10 At least one city is supposed to have such close family ties. (9,4)
14 Do they authorize action for jingoistic ravings? (8)
16 One reputedly burnt by a king—nothing close to dessert. (7)
17 Obvious up-coming plunge onto a broken net. (7)
18 Split bar, with direction to be side by side. (7)
19 Moving in the direction of the title? (7)
20 The flag of a writer, anything but French. (6)

SOLUTION TO PUZZLE NO. 1639

ACROSS: 1 and 5 Awkward silence; 9 and 24 Good and proper; 10 Atropos; 11 Nutty; 12 Climactic; 15 Embosom; 18 Pas; 20 Mae; 21 Encases; 23 Adam; 26 Transport; 28 Karma; 29 Rapture; 30 Sharply; 31 Sherbet; 32 Salerno. DOWN 1 and 18 Angina pectoris; 2 Knotty; 3 Amaryllis; 4 Deduced; 5 Seaside; 6 Larva; 7 Nepotism; 8 and 25 Easy come, easy go; 13 Pan; 16 Black ball; 17 Oar; 19 Scrapple; 22 Slowest; 23 Artists; 27 and 14 Squabbled.

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

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